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I.

INTRODUCTION

A. Prelude: Chevron Case and the Challenge of Governing
Transnational Corporations Through "Soft Law"
After 18 years of litigation, on February 14, 2011 an Ecuadorian
judge ordered the oil conglomerate Chevron to pay 18 billion dollars in
damages, "the largest judgment ever awarded in an environmental
lawsuit," 1 in the oil contamination case Afectados ('the Affected') v.
1.

See Patrick R. Keefe, Reversal of Fortune,
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Chevron. 2 The judgment was affirmed on appeal a year later, 3 yet the
case is far from over. The liable parties remain to be called to account
and the environmental damage is still to be remedied. Chevron no
longer has considerable assets in Ecuador, 4 it has lodged an appeal with
the Ecuadorian Supreme Court, and an UNCITRAL arbitration before
the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague has witnessed
a number of interim awards in favor of Chevron. 5 In the media the case
has been described as a local plaintiffs' apparently fruitless legal
struggle in a society with a corrupt judiciary and political and economic
dependence on foreign oil companies. 6
The Chevron case evidences the difficulties in properly governing
transnational corporations (TNCs), sometimes even to prevent the most
egregious of abuses. Multiple international and domestic laws may be
applicable, but that often seems detrimental rather than helpful.
Weaknesses in the content, implementation and enforcement of laws
may allow the politically and economically powerful parties to
dominate the situation. Thus, in cases such as Chevron, alternative
means of governance are desperately needed to address the failures of
classic international and domestic law in protecting the environment and
human rights. "Soft law" is then often hailed as the remedy. Chevron,
for example, is indeed an active participant in several voluntary
initiatives and schemes, such as the Social Responsibility Group of the
International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation
Association (IPIECA). 7 Chevron was also one of the companies
consulted during the drafting of UN Special Representative John

available at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2012/0l/09/120109fa_fact_keefe (last
visited Mar. 26, 2014).
2. Aguinda y Otros v. Chevron Corp., (2011) Trial No. 2003-0002, Provincial Court of
Justice of Sucumbios (Ecuador), available at http://chevrontoxico.com/assets/docs/2011-0214-Aguinda-v-ChevronTexaco-judgement-English.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2014).
3. Aguinda y Otros v. Chevron Corp., (2012) Case No. 2011-0106, Provincial Court of
Justice of Sucumbios (Ecuador), available at http://chevrontoxico.com/assets/docs/2012-0103-appeal-decision-english.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2014).
4. See Patrick R. Keefe, Why Chevron will Settle in Ecuador, THE NEW YORKER (Jan.
4, 2012), available at http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2012/0l/whychevron-will-settle-in-ecuador.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2014).
5. Chevron Corp. & Texaco Petroleum Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador (U.S. v.
Ecuador), 2009-23 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2013) ("Fourth Interim Award on Interim Measures");
Chevron Corp. & Texaco Petroleum Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador (U.S. v. Ecuador), 200923 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2012) ("Third Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility").
6. Reversal of Fortune, supra note 1, at 2.
7. See International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Association
(IPIECA), available at http://www.ipieca.org/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2014).

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol41/iss2/3

4

Kalimo and Staal: "Softness" in International Instruments: The Case of Transnationa

2014]

"Softness" in International Instruments

261

Ruggie' s UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. 8
Proposing "soft law" as the solution in more effectively governing
transnational giants such as Chevron leads, however, to a fundamental
conundrum: it remains quite unclear what the notion of "soft law"
entails, and why and how it could be able to provide an adequate policy
response. The objective of this paper therefore is to clarify the
discussion through a detailed theoretical analysis of "soft law", and to
test the findings in the practically pivotal area of the environmental and
human rights conduct of TNCs.

B. The Thesis and the Objectives
This paper claims, using the fields of environmental protection and
human rights as examples, that "soft law" is conceptually and
substantively inadequate and misleading in filling the voids left by
classic "hard law" in governing TNCs. A reconceptualization of, and a
more systematic approach to, soft instruments is required if they are to
play a constructive part in filling the void.
The paper proceeds in five steps to prove its thesis and to propose
remedies to the identified shortcomings. The first objective is to show
that what has been called classic "hard law" - state laws and the formal
sources of international law - seems to fail in adequately governing
transnational corporations (TNCs). Second, the paper explains why
other, "soft law" instruments are believed to address the void, but
reveals as the third step that the current way of understanding such
other, "soft law" instruments is inadequate and too general for assessing
the successes or failures of such a very diverse group of instruments.
The paper therefore seeks as its fourth objective to create and assess
better methods for approaching the void, and proposes to that account a
tool that re-conceptualizes and systemizes the soft law discourse. Fifth,
preliminary tests of such a new tool are conducted by applying it to
practical case studies of TNC behavior in the fields of environmental
and human rights protection. The paper concludes by showing how the
notion of "soft law" is not only obscure and inadequate, as has been
previously contended by other scholars, but that it also is conceptually
deceptive in ways that risk leading towards ineffective policy
instruments. "Softness" on the other hand does seem instructive for
better understanding and reacting to the challenges of managing
transnational corporations.

8. Obviously, the "soft law" instruments cited here date from after the relevant facts of
the Chevron case.
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II. THE CHALLENGE OF GOVERNING TRANSNATIONAL
CORPORATIONS (TNCS)
A. Business Across the Borders
The first objective of this paper is to show how classic "hard law"
seems to fail in adequately governing transnational corporations
(TNCs). The UN's Special Representative on business and human
rights has stated that TNCs come in many varieties on a scale from little
The
to almost complete reliance on transnational activities. 9
qualification of a company as a TNC is thus not based on its legal
personality; corporations of various legal forms can be included in the
category of TNCs. More important than an undisputable definition of a
TNC is, however, that there are important factual and regulatory
problems that arise as a consequence of corporations pursuing activities
in multiple jurisdictions. Globalization of the marketplace has driven
companies to operate across borders. Many companies have become
TNCs, and many TNCs have become global actors. This is no longer
limited to developed country based businesses; numerous TNCs are
Asian or South American companies. With the emergence of multiple
trade areas (such as ASEAN in South-East Asia or the Andean
Community in Latin-America) the TNC has truly 'gone global.'
B. The Sanctuary of Multiple Jurisdictions
The activities of TNCs are spread among the territories of many
so-called host states. In the majority of cases, and often due to
requirements in domestic laws, they are nonetheless based in a single
home state. In contrast to domestically operating businesses, however,
they do not fall under the complete control of a single jurisdiction, not
even that of their home state. They are partially subject to the domestic
legal systems of their home state and of all the host states in which parts
of their fragmented, networked activities take place or have effects.
Domestic laws are to an increasing extent harmonized by
international law, such as customary law and conventions. On many
issues, however, domestic legal systems still vary considerably, in
particular in the implementation and enforcement of law. This variance
may create a void: activities in a particular jurisdiction risk escaping the
(legal) consequences that would and should have followed.
A
hazardous part of waste treatment activities may be located in a country
9. See Rep. of the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the U.N. Human
Rights Council, 8th Sess., Protect, Respect and Remedy, 116-7, 15, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5
(2008) (by John G. Ruggie).
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where such activities are not subject to (stringent) standards, for
example, or labor-intensive work in the textile sector is set up in a
country where labor laws permit longer working hours, or the part of
operations that is subject to high taxes in the company's de facto home
state is formally relocated to a tax haven.
Innovative judges may find ways around the issue of multiple
jurisdictions with different substantive standards. In some of the recent
judgments from the lower court and the court of appeals in the Chevron
case, for example, the judges were not held back by the fact that neither
environmental standards nor legal protection of the areas belonging to
indigenous people existed in Ecuador at the time of the tort. Yet the
judges reasoned that it was enough that "the existence of damages has
been verified," combined with "the right to obtain compensation for
damages suffered in its various forms, which was recognized by the
Civil Code well before the start of Texpet [Texaco, predecessor of
Chevron] activities in the Amazon." 10 Thus, a specific prohibition of an
environmental harm was not deemed necessary to establish a tort. In
various Westem jurisdictions, arguments are being forwarded that the
home state standards should apply to 'their' TNCs' activities in the host
states as well. 11
C. Resistance Towards the Implementation and Reform of
Domestic Law and International Law
The opportunities of globalization have made many transnationally
operating companies extremely wealthy, superseding in economic terms
many nation states. The largest TNCs have become especially
influential economic and political players, both in the various domestic
jurisdictions where they operate, as well as on the global level. For
example, many developing countries rely on TNCs to use their
resources. The TNCs may thereby have a clear advantage over local
actors in influencing the creation or implementation of law by domestic
authorities, although this will vary case by case. Unlike local
companies, TNCs can often rather easily shift their activities from one
country to another, should a local government advocate for instance to
10. Aguinda, Case No. 2011-0106 at para. 9 (further arguing by the Appeals Court
found "the fact that there is no express mention of environmental damages in references to
contingent damages in the Civil Code does not mean that environmental damages cannot be
contingent damages, nor does it mean that the legislature wished to exclude the possibility
that environmental damages could be considered to be contingent damages.").
11. See Jonathan Verschuuren, Overcoming the Limitations of Environmental Law in a
Globalised World (Tilburg Univ. Legal Studies Working Paper Series, Paper No. 20, 2010),
available at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssm.1582857 (last visited Mar. 26, 2014).
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more stringently enforce costly environmental standards. TNCs are also
often backed by Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs ), concluded
between their home state and their host state. The BITs may allow the
TNCs to threaten to sue the host state for expropriation, should the
enforcement of laws risk harming the company economically. Such a
BIT is also the basis for Chevron's claim before the PCA in the
Chevron case. 12
TNCs--especially when acting together through sectorial global
business associations or high-profile events such as the World
Economic Forum in Davos 13 - are also a powerful force influencing
the decisions made in international organizations and diplomatic
negotiations. The scope of the TNCs' organizations gives them a global
overview and a strategic grip of the policy discourse that particularly the
developing states may struggle to match. This power may allow the
TNCs to create or sustain a void on the global level, which moves or
keeps parts of the corporations' operations beyond the reach of the
domestic and international legal orders.

D. Domestic Law and the Legal Void in Regulating TNCs - Host
State and Home State Dimensions
The ability of the TNCs to escape full regulatory control and to
exert political pressure on decision makers clearly creates the risk of a
legal void. 14 This paper defines a legal void as a regulatory situation in
which a TNC behavior, permitted in a host state, would have been in
violation of the laws of the TNC home state or of international law. The
legal void may be viewed as part of a (wider) policy void, whereby the
public policy objective on the particular question is not reached.
The legal void reveals itself in a slightly different fashion in the
home states (where the company is incorporated) than in the host states
(where the TNCs operate). As De Peyter submits, "developing and
transition countries [i.e. often the 'host states'] compete to attract
12. Ecuador Bilateral Investment Treaty, U.S.-Ecuador, Aug. 27, 1993, S. TREATY
Doc. No. 103-15.
13. The publicly visible tip of the proverbial iceberg of this political influence
occurred at the yearly World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. See Ellen Payne, The
Road to the Global Compact: Corporate Power And The Battle Over Global Public Policy
at The United Nations, GLOBAL PoL'Y FORUM (Oct. 2000), available at
http://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/GPF_The_road_to_the_global_compact_October_
2000.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2014). Incidentally, the 1999 Forum was also one of the
earliest occasions where the UN Global Compact was formally and informally discussed.
Id.

14. The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights speak of "governance
gaps created by globalization." See Ruggie, supra note 9, at 3.
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foreign investment and technology to exploit natural resources, and are
often reluctant to impose human rights and other conditions on foreign
companies." 15 In the case of developing country host states, there thus
may be a system of laws that is applicable-the problem is that it either
sets very low standards (in which case the legal void is qualitative) or it
does not properly apply the higher standards (in which case the legal
void is one of enforcement).
On the other hand, De Peyter continues, "[t]he home state is faced
with the difficulty that, in principle, the reach of domestic law is limited
to its own territory." 16 To overcome the limits of home country
jurisdiction, some states exceptionally recognize universal or extraterritorial civil jurisdiction over torts outside their territory. 17 However,
the potential of such extra-territorial jurisdiction is for various reasons
quite limited. 18 Suffice it to say here that international law allows extraterritorial (or universal) jurisdiction only for a few crimes under
international customary law. These offenses may be enforced by any
state( s) regardless of their ties with the offense. 19
Another possibility to overcome the home state problem is the
active nationality principle, which allows a state to exercise prescriptive
and adjudicative jurisdiction over its nationals for offenses they commit
abroad. In practice, however, states are not likely to use this option
more than sparsely, and have done so in the past only for a limited
number of crimes. An important reason for this is that it conflicts with
competing jurisdictional claims of other states, primarily the
territoriality principle. Another reason is that international law does not
allow states to enforce such jurisdiction abroad, for example to collect
evidence or to make arrests.
E. International Law and the Legal Void in Regulating TNCs
If there is a void in domestic law regulating TNC activities, one
might assume that international law could better succeed in addressing
this distinct group of actors. Surely international law, which can

15. Koen De Feyter, Globalisation and Human Rights, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 68, 81-82 (Felipe Gomez Isa & Koen de Feiter eds., 2009).
16. Id. at 82 ( emphasis added).
17. See United States' Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2011).
18. See also Donald F. Donovan & Anthea Roberts, The Emerging Recognition of
Universal Civil Jurisdiction, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 142, 142-63 (2006).
19. Universal civil jurisdiction of U.S. courts remains nonetheless a tool of at least
some usefulness for the most gruesome abuses that remain unprosecuted in the states where
they occur.
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potentially contain universal or near-universal rules, 20 could help in
filling the void left by domestic law. In addition, it could be argued that
the international legal order is positioned 'close' to the transnational
sphere, where TNCs themselves operate.
There are four ways in which international human rights law may
apply or be applied to TNCs: 21 (1) it can be applied directly, (2) almost
directly, (3) transposed into national law or (4) applied indirectly. In
international environmental law, the picture is somewhat different,
because directly and almost directly applicable international law is
practically non-existent. The application of most international law to
individuals depends on transposition or indirect application.
Particularly those two means of application do not overcome a number
of obstacles to effectively regulating TNCs through international law.
As noted earlier, the matter is elaborated here through the examples of
international environmental and human rights law.

1. Lack ofInternational Law (Almost) Directly and Specifically
Applicable to TNCs
In contrast to states and intergovernmental organizations, TNCs are
generally not considered subjects of international law, and are as such
not directly bound by most of it. 22 TN Cs entertain only certain rights
and have a limited set of obligations 23 on the basis on international law
directly. These rights and obligations are similar to those directly
applicable to all private actors. 24 Direct applicability of international
law entails that both national judicial organs of home, host and
potentially other states, as well as international tribunals, enforce the
international law obligations directly, even without such provisions
being transposed into national law. 25 The direct applicability of
international law to the conduct 26of TN Cs as private actors is limited to
a few international human rights related crimes, such as genocide and

20. Jonathan Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 529 (1993).
21. This section uses the taxonomy suggested by J. Knox. J. Knox, Horizontal Human
Rights Law, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (2008).
22. P.A. NOLLKAEMPER, KERN VAN HET INTERNATIONAL PUBLIEKRECHT 58-59 {5th ed.
2011 ). For human rights specifically see e.g. R. McCorquodale, Corporate Social
Responsibility and International Human Rights Law, 87 J. Bus. ETHICS 385 (2009).
23. If a legal provision requires an action or inaction from an actor, it is a legal
obligation.
24. See Knox, supra note 21, at 2 (speaking generally of private duties).
25. The question of extraterritoriality arises in the context of applying it in home
states, however. See infra Section 2.5.2.
26. The present paper does not focus on the rights of TN Cs.

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol41/iss2/3

10

Kalimo and Staal: "Softness" in International Instruments: The Case of Transnationa

2014]

"Softness" in International Instruments

267

crimes against humanity, based on customary international law. 27 As
mentioned above, universal jurisdiction to enforce such obligations is
the least controversial.
There is another set of obligations that, in Knox's terminology, is
applied "almost directly" to private actors. These obligations are not
directly applicable, but they specifically instruct states-including
dualist states-how to place requirements on private actors and how to
enforce them through domestic laws. The transposition of such
provisions is thus strictly predetermined. 28 The Convention Against
Torture29 as well as the Convention on Child Labor30 contain examples
of such "almost directly applicable international law." However, the
limited number of these kinds of provisions leave many parts of the
legal void uncovered. Another reason for the void is that the provisions
do not tend to address the behavior of TNCs specifically. 31
As far as the international obligations that are placed "almost
directly" upon the individuals are specific, they de facto create quasiuniversal domestic criminal law. In other words, the global application
is decentralized, so that the direct applicability, and almost direct
applicability, approaches can make good use of domestic courts'
enforcement capacities, which are far superior to those of international
judicial institutions. Political will permitting, this seems the most
promising international law track to pursue in governing TNCs. It
could in theory combine a universal and precise prescription of

27. In the words of the human rights scholar John Knox, "virtually all of these duties
are found in international criminal law. The paradigmatic example is the Genocide
Convention, which states that 'genocide ... is a crime under international law' that the
parties 'undertake to prevent and to punish,' through both domestic tribunals and 'such
international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction.'" Knox, supra note 21, at 28. These
provisions are not only directly targeted at, but also internationally enforced upon individual
parties, including TNCs. Id. Direct applicability to companies is sometimes seen to be
contrary to the basic consensual premise of international law. Id. How can TNCs have
obligations on the basis of international law to which they have not consented?
28. Id. at 28-29. The obligations concern duties such as the prohibitions on slavery
(Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery the Slave Trade, and Institutions
and Practices Similar to Slavery, April 30, 1956) and torture (Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, December 10, 1984).
The states parties to these conventions are obliged to make slavery and torture criminal
offences under their domestic laws, and to enforce them upon private parties. Id.
29. Knox, supra note 21, at 28-29
30. Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, June 17, 1999, 871.L.C. 182.
31. An example of the latter is arguably the International Convention on Civil Liability
for Oil Pollution Damage ('CLC'), 1992 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil,
Pollution Damage (Cosilidated Text of the 1969 Convention, Incorporating the Amendments
of 1976, 1992, and 2000), November 29, 1969, INT'L MARITIME ORG., available at
http://www.iopcfund.org/npdf/Conventions%20English. pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
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obligations specifically for transnational commercial activities with the
high enforcement capacities of domestic authorities. A contracting state
would not fulfill its own international obligations, should it not enforce
the provisions against TN Cs under its jurisdiction.
2. Poor Domestic Implementation and Enforcement of
International Law - Back to Square One?

The third and fourth types of international law that deal with the
internal policies of developed western states, including international
human rights law and international environmental law, are not directly
applicable to TNCs. 32 International treaty provisions need to be
properly transposed into the domestic legal system in order to create the
intended legal effect on the TNCs. The states often retain a large
measure of freedom in this respect. For example, many environmental
treaty provisions, such as the provisions in the Montreal Protocol on the
downscaling of the production of ozone depleting substances, must be
first transposed into domestic law and then properly implemented if a
state is to meet its obligations under the treaty. The treaty will in this
way become binding, not only on the state in question, but also in the
form of national law on those operating a production facility of ozone
depleting substances within the jurisdictions.
The obligation to incorporate and enforce the international norm
rests on the states and it is left to the state in question to decide exactly
how it will incorporate and enforce the international law provisions.
This is problematic if the content of the international norm is too vague
to establish clearly whether a state has failed to discharge its duties or
not. This is often the case in international human rights law and
international environmental law.
Finally, international law may also be indirectly applicable on
TNCs. Indirect applicability means that the (existing) laws of the
domestic legal system are construed, i.e. interpreted in a manner that is
as much in conformity with international law as possible. 33 Most of the
international human rights law and international environmental law can
be considered indirectly applicable. 34
32. On indirect applicability, see infra note 33.
33. Andre Nollkaemper & Gerrit Betlem, Giving Effect to Public International Law

and European Community Law Before Domestic Courts. A Comparative Analysis of the
Practice of Consistent Interpretation, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 569 (2003).
34. The two general international human rights conventions- the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, December 16, 1966 (ICCPR) and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, December 16, 1966 (ICESCR)- are
prominent examples of such international law obligations that apply indirectly to TNCs. The
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For example, state parties must take the above noted provisions of
the Montreal Protocol on the down-scaling of the production of ozone
depleting substances duly into consideration in interpreting their
relevant domestic norms, to be consistent with their obligations under
the treaty. The interpretation will affect also the TNCs operating within
the jurisdiction.
There is certain hierarchy in the way that domestic courts rely on
direct and indirect applicability of international law. In striving to
achieve conformity with the international norm, the courts give priority
to consistent interpretation, i.e. indirect applicability. Only if the
domestic law is so inconsistent with international law that it is not
reconcilable by favorably interpreting domestic law, will the courts rely
on international law directly. 35 Indirect applicability of international
law is thus the primary means of trying to fill in the gaps of domestic
law on TNCs.
However, the value added of all the not-directly-applicable
provisions of international law in diminishing the void left by domestic
law is often quite limited. The very same "host state problem" that was
explained for law of purely domestic origin resurfaces, unsurprisingly,
in the transposition, implementation and interpretation of international
obligations in domestic law. 36 The broad and generic language of
international agreements often leaves states ample room for discretion
in incorporating international law into domestic legislation, and even
more in enforcing it. The TNCs are able to exert their clout as with any
other domestic law.
The indirect application of interpreting
international law by courts would be in a better position, should the
courts be more resilient to (external political) pressure than the
legislature. This is not necessarily the case in practice, however. Yet
even where free from external pressures, the fragmented, transboundary
nature of TNC activities may in the end preclude any nation state--or
multiple states-from effectively enforcing an international
obligation. 37
The international law obligations are thus rarely globally directly
and specifically applicable to TNCs. The policy void of TNCs cannot
same goes for international obligations on states in the realm of environmental protection:
they have ultimately some impact upon the legality of natural and legal persons' behavior.
This is true for both monist and dualist states.
35. R.H. LAUWAARS & C.W.A. TIMMERMANS, EUROPEES GEMEENSCHAPSRECHT IN KORT
BESTEK 100 (4th ed. 1997); see also Nollkaemper & Betlem, supra note 33, at 569.
36. Questions relating to the monistic versus dualistic systems in transposing
international law are left aside here.
37. De Feyter, supra note 15, at 81-82.
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be fully and effectively addressed through present international law.
3. Nigerian Farmers v. Shell - the Absence ofInternational Law in
'Home State' Cases
The Nigerian Farmers v. Shell case is a good example of how
international law is still absent in 'home state' court cases that involve
'home state' TNCs. In that case, four inhabitants of Oruma (Nigeria)
sued Shell and its subsidiary companies before a civil court in the
Netherlands, i.e. the 'home state' of Shell. 38 The case concerned an oil
leakage from a Shell pipeline that had, according to the plaintiffs,
caused damage to the local environment and to the incomes of
fishermen and farmers. The domestic court in The Hague 39 decided that
according to Dutch conflict of laws rules on tort cases, it had to apply
Nigerian law to the dispute. Indeed, the case is a classic attestation of
the home state problem, where only the below-par developing country
standards are applied to TNCs.
Having decided that Nigerian law was applicable, the Dutch court
took another important procedural decision: it denied the plaintiffs
access to documents solely in possession of Shell cum suis, even though
the documents could have given further insight into the causes and
consequences of the oil leakage. The court concluded that Shell and its
Nigerian daughter company had, on the face of the evidence already
available to the court, not acted in violation of any obligations under
Nigerian law.
In making its decision, the court did not check whether Nigerian
law was in accordance with international environmental, human rights
or labor law. For example, the court concluded that under Nigerian law,
an oil company does not seem to be under an obligation to replace
deteriorated pipelines. Yet, the court did not examine whether there
were international rules that would have forced Nigeria to enact such an
obligation, or that would have mandated it to interpret Nigerian law in
accordance with international law. The obligation would have existed
in the legal system of The Netherlands and other developed countries.
The court also disregarded all potential violations of international law in
concluding that under Nigerian law, only the owner of a polluted fishing
pond or property was able to claim losses, and that future losses could
not be claimed.
The stance taken by the Dutch court seems understandable from
38. Milieudefensie v. Royal Dutch Sell PLC and Shell Petroleum Development
Company, Merits Decision of 30 January 2013 (LJN: BU3535) [Language: Dutch].
39. To be clear, this is not one of the Hague international courts and tribunals.
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the viewpoint of sovereignty. It would be quite far-reaching if a court
were to rule on the compatibility of another country's law with
international standards. It is also doubtful whether any international
standards were sufficiently precise so as to enable a meaningful
conformity check. Still, it seems somewhat illogical that as soon as a
foreign law becomes applicable, international law will no longer be of
relevance. And what would be the difference between applying foreign
law and applying international norms to which the foreign state has
consented? Whatever the merits of the above considerations, it seems
unlikely both in practice and in legal theory that international law will
fill the legal void in cases like this.
F. "Hard Law" As an Insufficient Means to Address TNCs

To summarize, the current framework of domestic law and
international law appears incapable of fully managing the effects of
globalization, in particular the global nature of commercial activities.
The variation in domestic laws, together with the TNCs' economic and
political power and ability to partially avoid falling under the laws of a
specific state, allows the corporations to operate to some degree in a
legal void. As defined above, a legal void is a regulatory situation in
which a TNC behavior in a host state would have been in violation of
the laws of the TNC home state or of international law. There is very
limited directly applicable international law, and the transposition,
implementation and enforcement of international law usually leave the
several state institutions/branches with (considerable) room for
maneuver. International law is therefore unable to improve the
situation.
As a result of the problems that both national and international law
have in controlling TNCs, there is room for misconduct. In the words
of the UN Special Representative:
The root cause of the business and human rights predicament today
lies in the governance gaps created by globalization-between the scope
and impact of economic forces, and the capacity of societies to manage
their adverse consequences. These governance gaps provide the
permissive environment for wrongful acts by companies of all kinds
without adequate sanctioning or reparation.
The Chevron case, introduced at the outset of this paper, is a case
in point on these challenges. The Ecuadorian government had been in a
joint venture with the oil company at the time of the pollution. It thus
appears to have been at least silently complicit in the abuses. The whole
of the Ecuadorian economy had been dependent on the exploitation of
oil resources, so there was a counter-incentive to faithfully implement
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national legislation or international rules. The Ecuadorian judicial
system offered no remedy, either, as it proved to be extremely weak and
corrupt. Several judges had to step down during the long process amidst
accusations of corruption, while others were seen to have a clear
allegiance with either side of the conflict. 40
In terms of environmental law, Chevron did acknowledge the
environmental pollution to some degree, but argued that its predecessor
Texaco had acted "completely in line with the standards of the day" and
that "[t]he practices did not directly violate Ecuadoran law; in fact, the
country had no meaningful environmental regulations at the time." 41 In
other words, behavior that presumably would have been illegal in the
United States at the time, 42 was in all earnestness claimed to be
perfectly legitimate in Ecuador. However, the courts in the United
States, where the case had originally been brought in 1993, found in
2001 that the case had "everything to do with Ecuador and very little to
do with the United States."43 It thereby refused an extra-territorial
application of U.S. law, affirming that a U.S. company did not have to
live up to U.S. standards as long as it acted abroad and the judicial
system there did not take issue with the activities.
It is telling that probably the clearest invocation of international
law in the Chevron case was on the part of the TNC-defendant Chevron.
The legal representatives of the company moved the forum to the
Permanent Court of Arbitration on the basis of the Bilateral Investment
Treaty between the U.S. and Ecuador. All in all, the Chevron case is a
tangible illustration of the failures of domestic, extraterritorial and
international law in governing TNCs in a global environment.
It has so far proven impossible to come to a formal international
agreement, or a treaty specifically addressing TNCs or transnational
commercial activities to alleviate the void. Perhaps such a treaty even
could not alleviate the matter, as it too may be bound to suffer from
many of the structural problems previously explained. It appears very
unlikely that the causes behind the void will disappear any time soon.
The governance of TNCs (or transnational commercial activities more
generally) clearly appears to require responses beyond classic "hard
law".

40. Reversal of Fortune, supra note 1, at 4.
41. Id. at 5.
42. "In the United States, it is standard practice, once the oil has been isolated from
this mixture, to 're-inject' the produced water, pumping it deep underground into dedicated
wells, in order to prevent damage to the local habitat." Id. at 5.
43. Id. at 6.
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III. FILLING WITH "SOFT LAW" THE VOID LEFT BY "HARD
LAW"?
The last two decades have witnessed a continuous proliferation of
instruments-public, private and any combination thereof-that
specifically address TNCs, but seem to do so by expanding beyond the
notion of classic "hard law". Strictly speaking, instruments that fall
outside the category of "law" cannot perhaps alleviate a legal void. But
they may, in more general terms, address the practical problem at stake,
which is abusive company behavior. Instruments other than legal ones
can, in other words, alleviate the policy void in question.
The term "soft law" has often been used to denote these types of
instruments. The multiplicity, volume and variance of such soft
instruments, as well as their coexistence with the "hard law" framework
has created a regulatory situation that is much more difficult to
understand than the 'straight-forward' formal agreements. 44 Scholarly
and practical attention seems necessary to better understand the
possibilities and shortcomings of using "soft law" instruments in filling
the void left by "hard law."
The reasons that are often presented for using "soft law" 45 may be
divided into three generic groups.
Necessity-there exists only limited binding and effective hard
now and in the foreseeable future;
Uniqueness-the coverage of "soft law" instruments is extensive,
and may influence TNCs in ways that "hard law" does not. They can be
much more specific to TNC behavior, and their adoption and adaptation
may be more flexible and quicker; and
Inevitability-the emerging transnational space renders it
inevitable that a separate transnational normative order emerges as well.
It inevitably consists of other types of instruments, as the non-state
actors who operate in this space cannot make "hard law."
A more careful look into these three, partly overlapping groups
appears instructive for properly understanding the reasons that have
been proposed to explain the emergence "soft law" (Sections A and B,
infra). It is important to shortly describe also the views of those more
pessimistic about the use of "soft law" as an alternative or a
complement to classic "hard law". Some authors see "soft law" rather as
working antagonistically against "hard law" (see Section C, infra).
44. The nonnativity of "hard law" also remains to a large extent a mystery. See Martti
Koskenniemi, The Mystery of Legal Obligation, 3 INT'L THEORY 319 (2011 ).
45. See also Jean d' Aspremont, The Politics of Deformalization in International Law 3
Goettingen J. INT'L L. 503 (2011 ).

Published by SURFACE, 2014

17

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 41, No. 2 [2014], Art. 3

274

Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com.

[Vol. 41 :2

A. Turning a Political Necessity into a Virtue - "Soft Law" as an
Alternative or Precursor to "Hard Law"
First of all, non-binding instruments appear to be in many cases a
sheer necessity. As long as no directly applicable, legally binding
instruments specifically aimed at the behavior or TNCs will be adopted
by states, nor existing international and national laws reformed to this
effect, the rationalist perspective is to see "soft law" as the alternative. 46
The large and diverse array of non-legal instruments may simply be the
best attainable means to govern TNCs. A binding international
agreement to govern TNCs directly is indeed unlikely in the foreseeable
future, 47as many states and much of the private sector continue to resist
the idea for the reasons and with the means explained below. At the
same time, however, a certain willingness to adopt instruments of a
voluntary character can be observed.
A related point is to see soft instruments as precursors to formal
agreements. In a situation where an outright formal agreement is
politically unattainable, other types of instruments can be used as
intermediate steps towards it. These alternative instruments may be
used to, for example, experiment with a new rule or to innovatively
encourage changes in the behavior of relevant actors. Exposure to the
new ideas will, the theory assumes, prepare the regulators and
regulatees up to a point where they are ready to take the ultimate step
towards "hard law". 48 This is relatively common in areas with
considerable (scientific) uncertainty regarding the optimal contents and
effects of the policies in tackling a particular problem. 49 However, this

46. Gregory C. Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives,
Complements, and Antagonists in International Governance, 94 MrNN. L. Rev. 706, 722
(2010).
47. The last attempt, the 'Norms on Responsibility' did not make it above the level of
a sub-commission of the Human Rights Council. See, e.g., De Feyter, supra note 15, at 8182. And the more recent UN Guiding Principles make explicit that they are not intended as
the precursor to a binding international agreement. See Report of the Special Representative
of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and
other business enterprises & Report from the Special Representative of the Secretary
General to the U.N. Human Rights Council, Guiding Principles on Business and Human

Rights: Implementing the United Nations "Protect, Respect and Remedy" Framework,
A/HRC/17 /31
(Mar.
21,
2011 ),
available
at
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/A-HRC-l 7-3 l_AEV.pdf (last visited
Feb. 12, 2014).
48. JOHN J. KIRTON & MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK (eds.), HARD CHOICES, SOFT LAW:
VOLUNTARY STANDARDS IN GLOBAL TRADE, ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL GOVERNANCE 28
(Ashgate, ed. 2004).
49. See, e.g., Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, Learning from Difference: The New
Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the EU, 14 EUR. L.J. 271 (2008).
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type of precursory role for soft instruments is relatively weak in areas
where the obstacles to "hard law" are political, rather than relate to
uncertainty.
Finally, soft law instruments may be seen as a necessity also from
the perspective of non-state actors, in case they themselves act as
regulators: these parties obviously do not even have the direct means to
develop classic "hard law".
B. Unique Qualities of "Soft Law" - A Complement to "Hard
Law"

Soft law instruments often are unique in terms of their versatility,
scope and/or "depth." The large number of different kinds of soft
instruments means that they are many times aimed much more
specifically at the problems caused by the activities of TNCs than are
formally binding instruments. They may be used to address TNC
behavior in more elaborate detail than, for instance, international human
rights conventions, which have an evident legacy as acts aimed
primarily at state behavior and rarely are very specific as to what
amounts to proper or improper behavior. It seems important also for
these reasons to gauge whether and how this large body of instruments
may actually alleviate the policy void on TNCs.
Another, interlinked argument is that soft instruments possess
different qualities than formal international law. Many policy tools
work in ways that are not dependent upon the core characteristic of
"hard law", which is to create legally binding rights and obligations on
parties. Constructivists in particular argue that soft law can promote
discursive, experimentalist processes that can transform the way norms
are perceived and created. 50 Such means may even be preferable from
the perspective of responsive governance. 51 In comparison with rules
that need to go through the entire legislative or treaty-making process,
they may also be much faster to set up and to flexibly change
afterwards. But whether and how exactly such "soft law" could
complement "hard law" is precisely the question that deserves further
clarification. This is all the more so, considering that soft instruments
may even be inevitable or inherent in the phenomenon of globalization.
According to Nijman and Nollkaemper, "[o]ne of the challenges that
globalization poses to legal theory is precisely the emergence of 'nonState' legal orders, and the resulting need for a conceptual framework
50. Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 46, at 722.
51. Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law
Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. Rev. 1015, 1019-20 (2004).
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which enables our discipline to accommodate different legal cultures." 52
In other words, these instruments may correctly reflect the fact that the
activities of TNCs are of such a special kind that they warrant a unique
approach. As noted, if TNCs, NGOs and other non-state parties act
themselves in these transnational normative orders as rule makers, then
there may not even be any other choice but to resort to soft instruments.
TNCs and NGOs simply do not have the capacity under international
law to make legal instruments, nor are they directly subjects of
international law.

C. Counter-Productive Uses of Soft Law- the Antagonist
Approach
Shaffer and Pollack claim that all three principle schools of
thought that address the strengths and weaknesses of soft law and "hard
law"-positivists 53 , rationalists 54 and constructivists 55-tend to see them
as alternatives or mutually supporting complements. 56 These authors
raise doubts about the proposition that new soft instruments are always
adopted with a view to decreasing the policy void. More attention
should be paid to "soft law" as an antagonist to "hard law", 57 because it
frequently leads to inconsistencies and conflicts among norms. Or
52. JAMES NUMAN & ANDRE NOLLKAEMPER, NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE DIVIDE
BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL LAW 349 (Oxford University Press, ed. 2007)
(paraphrasing WILLIAM TWINING, GLOBALISATION AND LEGAL THEORY 51 (Butterworths
2000)) ("Today, a picture of law in the world must deal with a much more complex picture
involving established, resurgent, developing, nascent and potential forms of legal ordering."
Id. Twining furthermore asks: "[c]an public international law, as traditionally conceived,
cope adequately with such problems as environment, international crime, and basic human
needs or rights at the global level?"); see also Peer Zumbansen, Transnational Private
Regulatory Governance: Ambiguities of Public Authority and Private Power (Osgoode
Paper
No.
45,
2012),
available
at
CLPE,
Working
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2 l 8503 l (last visited Apr. 1, 2014).
53. See, e.g., Jan Klabbers, The Undesirability of Soft Law, 67 NORDIC J. INT'L. 381
(1998); Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law, 77 AM. J. INT'L
L. 413 (1983).
54. See, e.g., Charles Lipson, Why Are Some International Agreements Informal?,
INT'L ORGS. 495 (1991); Andrew Guzman, The Design of International Agreements, 16
EUR. J. INT'L L. 579 (2005); ANDREW GUZMAN, How INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A
RATIONALIST CHOICE THEORY (Oxford University Press 2010); Kal Raustiala, Form and
Substance in International Agreements, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 581 (2005).
55. See, e.g., David Trubek, Patrick Cottrell & Mark Nance, "Soft Law," "Hard Law,"

and

European

Integration:

Toward

a

Theory

of

Hybridity,

available

at

http://eucenter.wisc.edu/OMC/Papers/EUC/trubeketal.pdf (last visited Apr. I, 2014).
56. Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 46, at 707-08.
57. This argument has been made by others before, albeit in a less comprehensive way.
For example, NGOs, who have long held this position, oppose voluntary instruments in part
because they tend to bring hard law" negotiations to a standstill.
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worse, this may have been the aim from the outset. The antagonistic
behavior has specific implications in a fragmented legal system,
resulting in a "strategic hardening of "soft law" regimes and softening
of hard-law regimes, or in a pre-emption of "hard law" through "soft
law." These kinds of situations arise under conditions of distributive
conflicts between states and in regime complexes, in particular. 58 They
also fit well the notion of legal pluralism, where numerous
heterogeneous legal orders coexist, interact and compete without clear
hierarchies. 59 "Soft law" in this sense is inevitably a part of
globalization.
D. Interactions Between "Soft Law" and "Hard Law"
The last-mentioned, antagonistic perspectives on "soft law" are not
at the core of this paper, which focuses on the ability of "soft law" to fill
the void left by "hard law". It is nevertheless important to realize,
following Shaffer and Pollack, that "hard law" and soft law are not in a
binary either/or relationship. Rather, their interaction is rather one
where specific conditions are conducive to making the actors employ
them as alternatives, complements or antagonists. 6 This paper strives
to contribute to the discourse by exploring the notion of softness and
how that characteristic may reflect in the choice of the instrument in
each individual case. The analysis leads to observations about how on
occasion, neither a hard nor soft type of an instrument is able to fill a
policy void, and that a focus on "soft law" may in fact only be leading
the attempts astray.

IV. FROM THE DEFICIENT NOTION OF "SOFT LAW''
TOWARDS AN ACCURATE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF
SOFTNESS
In order to understand whether "soft law" instruments may succeed
in alleviating the policy void in governing TNCs, and if so, how, it is
next pertinent to define in more detail what "soft law" actually means.
As the analysis below will reveal, the term "soft law" is rather
problematic: there seem to be more suitable terms than "soft law" to

58. Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 46, at 709, 728.
59. See, e.g., Martti Koskenniemi & Paivi Leino, Fragmentation of International Law?
Postmodern Anxieties, 15 LEIDEN J. INT. L. 553 (2002); Roderick A. MacDonald, Metaphors
of Multiplicity: Civil Society, Regimes, and Legal Pluralism, 69 ARIZ. J. INT. & COMP. L. 75
(1998).
60. Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 46, at 709.
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describe instruments that are not part of "hard law" in the classic sense
of the term. The terminological analysis will lead to a conceptualization
of instruments, which is believed to be more instructive for
understanding their key characteristics in terms of "softness." With the
tool, the suitability of a number of leading human rights and
environmental instruments that govern TNCs may then be analyzed in
the ensuing Section 5.
A. Definitional Deficiencies of "Soft Law"
1. An Incorrect Concept
The instruments looked at in this paper have often been grouped
together under a single concept: 'soft law.' 'Soft law' is widely used as
a concept to denote all normative instruments that do not amount to
classic "hard law". As Jan Klabbers, a staunch critic of the concept, has
submitted
"[ w]e tend to use the term soft law in order to describe things which
are difficult to describe as "hard law". Thus, guidelines, codes of
conduct, resolutions, recommendations and action programs,
indeterminate provisions of treaties, unratified conventions, perhaps
even the opinions of advocates general or dissenting opinions of
individual judges of the ICJ or the various human rights courts, they
may all perhaps be qualified as 'soft law.' Clearly they are not "hard
law"; clearly they are not totally irrelevant either, so voila: soft law it
must be."61

Klabbers and some other international legal scholars denounce the
idea that law can be "soft." "As soon as soft law is to be applied to any
specific set of circumstances, it collapses into either "hard law", or no
law at all." 62 In a binary world of law and non-law, soft law as an inbetween is incorrect: there either are or are not normative obligations
that are created when the law is applied ex post. The 'soft' part of the
concept creates confusion from another perspective. It glosses over the
fact that many 'soft instruments' have direct effects on the behavior of
states, TNCs and other actors, and they have indirect legal effects by
transforming subsequently into formal international law. Mechanisms
often employed by "soft law", such as economic incentives and
reputational costs, can be much more compulsory than the term soft
would indicate. They may be more effective than "hard law" itself, as
some of the authors noted in Section 3 have suggested.
61. Klabbers, supra note 53, at 385.
62. Id. at 382.
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As for the 'law' part of the concept, it seems rather odd to use it
where states or international organizations have usually quite
purposefully chosen "an instrument that lies outside the realm of law,"
and have thus indicated their specific intention "not to legally commit
themselves."63 Using the term "law" for something that is adopted
explicitly as something other than law threatens to blur the "normativity
threshold." This is so in particular if and when there is a point of
transition between law and non-law, between what does and does not
constitute a legal norm. 64

2. Too Generic a Concept
While soft law may be inaccurate as a concept, it also seems much
too generic to properly guide our understanding regarding the very
different nature, properties and normativity of the various instruments
relating to TNCs and their behavior. As long as there are the soft and
hard ends to the spectrum of instruments, it seems inevitable that there
are also shades of softness and hardness in between. At the very least,
there must be such spectrums from softer to harder within the two
binary categories of law and other instruments. A sharp binary
categorization seems unlikely to be helpful in explaining all the legal as
well as non-legal instruments, each with their different characteristics.
This is so especially for legal instruments with soft dimensions and for
non-legal instruments with hard dimensions. There is no denying the
growing disaggregation of power into myriad spheres of authority,
which may not (fully) be public authorities and that deliver formal and
informal rules and norms of various kinds. 65 There is considerable
66
This is
variance, whichever way one may wish to create categories.
certainly so with respect to instruments addressing the behavior of
TNCs.
Although it is thus not possible to describe all such variance with a
single term "soft law," it would seem equally unadvisable to limit the
use of the term to only a clear but narrow sub-group among the
variance. In this latter case, there is likely to exist a more accurate
63. Jean d' Aspremont, Softness in International Law: A Self-Serving Quest for New
Legal Materials 19 EUR. J. INT. L. 1075, 1081-82 (2008) (emphasis added).
64. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 2000); WEIL, supra note 51, at 415.
65. Martti Koskenniemi, The Fate of Public International Law: Between Techniques
and Politics, 70 Moo. L. Rev. 1 (2007); James Rosenau, Governing the Ungovernable: The
Challenge of Global Disaggregation of Authority, 1 REGULATION & GOVERNANCE 88, 88
(2007).
66. S. Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen & A. Vihma, Comparing the Legitimacy and
Effectiveness of Global Hard and Soft Power: An Analytical Framework, 3 REGULATION
AND GOVERNANCE 400, 401 (2009).
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descriptive term than "soft law" to explain the instruments in question.
Therefore, a simple dichotomy between "hard law" and soft law
(and also between law and "non-law") alone seems too stiff and
inaccurate to be useful for fully understanding the instruments, which
the terms intend to cover. 67 It remains important to maintain that binary
distinction, because in some contexts-such as domestic or international
adjudication-the legal status of an instrument continues to be relevant
for its softness or hardness. Yet it also seems vital to understand norms
to be on a continuum with a lot of diversity along numerous other
variables. 68
One may thus agree with for example d' Aspremont that a binary
approach to law is not in conflict with the growing complexity of
regulatory tools in contemporary international relations. 69 A binary
division may be maintained, but while distinguishing e.g. the different
regulatory choices and the gradations of normativity in the language
that are available for both legal and non-legal norms. The nuance and
the binary approach are not mutually exclusive. 70
B. The Lay of the Land in the Theory of "Soft Law"
Numerous attempts have been made to make sense of "soft law."
Problematic in these approaches has been the disregard for the idea of
maintaining the binary distinction in parallel with the more fluid
characterizations. The empirical basis of the attempts has also often
been wanting. 71 This Section highlights the views of authors that appear
the most insightful, and which therefore have served as the basis in this
paper for developing the methodology for assessing "soft law."

67. Laszlo Blutman, In the Trap of a Legal Metaphor: International Soft Law, 59
INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 605, 611 (2010); Matthias Goldmann, Inside Relative Normativity:
From Sources to Standard Instruments for the Exercise of International Public Authority, 9
GERMAN L. J. 1865, 1869 (2008) (Goldmann remarked that the term "soft law" is not much
more than a slightly more elegant way of saying "underconceptualized law." Accordingly,
he continues, we should use formal criteria to divide it into subspecies, each with its own
characteristics).
68. Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen & Vihma, supra note 66, at 402. See also Daniel Bodansky,
The Art and Craft of International Environmental Law (Harvard University Press 2010),
100-0 I, I 06-07 (emphasizing the importance of both legal status, as well as various other
characteristics).
69. d'Aspremont, supra note 63, at 1075.
70. Cf Jan Klabbers, The Redundancy of Soft Law, 65 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 167, 180
( 1996) ("law itself, for all its binariness, is capable of reflecting a whole spectre of subtleties
and nuances; ... law itself can accommodate various shades of grey without losing its
binary character").
71. Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen & Vihma, supra note 66, at 401.
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1. The Three Dimensions of Softness
Amongst the most quoted authors in describing "soft law" are
Abbott et al., who have proposed a continuum of legalization, 72 where
the softness or hardness of legalization may be measured in terms of the
"obligation, precision and delegation" of the measure. Obligation
means the (legally or otherwise) binding nature of the rule, precision
reflects the ability of the rule to unambiguously define conduct and
delegation refers to the extent to which an implementing and
interpretive authority has been defined. 73 Taking these three dimensions
seriously, most international instruments, including those on the 'law'
side of the binary distinction, seem soft in many respects. 74 This is
certainly true of global environmental and human rights treaties with
their many indeterminate provisions and limited delegation to third
parties.
To be more specific, the dimension of "obligation" is dependent
on the mandatory, normative-Abbott et al. use "binding"-nature of
the rule. Obligation seems to be a concept with multiple meanings. It
may indicate especially the mandatory quality of the language of the
instrument. The authority of the actors that adopted the instrument, or a
more general sentiment of obligation caused by the legitimacy of the
instrument is also central. Obligation thus can be linked to the concept
author, which Neil Komesar finds important from an institutional
perspective. 75 As he has suggested, the implications of a policy may
differ greatly according to the author.
"Precision", the second dimension proposed by Abbott et al.,
measures the extent that "that rules unambiguously define the conduct
The third dimension,
they require, authorize, or proscribe."76
"delegation", reminds us that not only the authority of the adopting
entities matters. The instrument's implementation, enforcement and
interpretation are quite relevant. 77 It needs to be determined who, if
72. These authors define legalization as "global regulation through diverse types of
norms."
73. Kenneth W. Abbott et al. , The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT'L ORG. 401, 401
(2000).
74. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International
Governance, 54 INT'LORG. 421, 422 (2000).
75. N. KOMESAR, 1MPERFECT ALTERNATIVES ' : CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS TN LAW,
ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 4-5 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1997).
76. Abbott et al., supra note 73, at 402.
77. The relevance of delegation to the normativity of international norms was already
stressed in Lauterpacht's critical analysis of the auto-interpretive character of international
law, or what he called "self-judging obligations." See HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE
FUNCTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY (Oxford Univ. Press
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anyone, is in charge, and how much authority is being delegated.
The approach of Abbott and Snidal to instrument choice, which
builds on these three dimensions of legalization, emphasizes the role of
different types of legalization in the instrumentalist hands of powerful
states. 78 For example, Chinkin's categories of "soft law" reflect these
three dimensions. 79 Weakening one or more of the dimensions turns
legal arrangements conveniently into "soft law" or vice versa. This is
essential from the perspective of governance, because TNCs may be
able to exert pressure towards the governing authorities on the types of
instruments that will be created.
2. Softness v. Effectiveness
It may be noted that Abbott et al. deliberately avoid assessing the
instruments' effects, as that would conflate delegation with effective
action. 80 Also in the analysis of this paper effectiveness is understood as
conceptually distinct from softness; the two must be evaluated
separately. While softness refers to low levels of obligation, precision
and delegation seems to correlate negatively with effectiveness, the
interrelationship between the two appears rather complex and casespecific. 81 There are many intervening external factors, such as the
degree of stakeholder agreement on the issue, reputational risks and
potential fringe benefits of compliance. Softness is not a conditio sine
qua non of ineffectiveness, nor is hardness a prerequisite of
effectiveness, even if the former usually increases the latter. 2 Indeed,
soft measures can be effective, otherwise the prospect of them acting as
alternatives to "hard law" would not materialize. Similarly, there would
be no need to complement or replace "hard law", if it could not be
1933).
78. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 74, at 421.
79. Christine M. Chinkin, The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in
International Law, 38 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 850 (1989). The degree of legalization (as
defined by Abbot et al. 's obligation, precision and delegation) is the independent variable,
effectiveness and legitimacy the dependent variables in determining softness. Abbott et al.,
supra note 73.
80. Abbott et al., supra note 73, at 402.
81. See Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen & Vihma, supra note 66, at 414. See, e.g., Jean-Marie
Kamatali, The New Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights' Contribution in
Ending the Divisive Debate over Human Rights Responsibilities of Companies: Is it Time
for an !CJ Advisory Opinion?, 20 CARDOZO J. lNT'L & COMP. L. 437, 449-50 (2012);
Gregory Shaffer & Tom Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn in International Legal Scholarship,
106 AM. J. lNT'L L. 1, 43-45 (2012); Deborah E. Rupp & Cynthia A. Williams, The Efficacy
of Regulation as a Function of Psychological Fit: Reexamining the /Soft Law Continuum, 12
THEO. lNQ. L. 581, 594-95 (2011).
82. See Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen & Vihma, supra note 66, at 414.
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ineffective. Thus, by not conflating softness and effectiveness, the
analysis of the instruments of governance remains more detailed and
transparent on the surface. The focus of this paper is precisely on this
softness aspect.
Karlsson-Vinkhyuzen and Vihma take a similar view in their
comparison of international norms: softness is the independent variable,
while effectiveness, together with legitimacy, emerge as the central,
overarching dependent variables. 83

3. lnstrumentum and Negotium
d' Aspremont proposes on the basis of the theory of legal acts that
in contemporary international law, it is either the instrumentum ("the
container") or the negotium (the "content") that can be softened. 84 The
softness of the instrumentum thus pertains to the choice of an instrument
outside the realm of law, defined as formal treaties or binding unilateral
declarations. 85 A soft instrumentum can also produce legal effects, such
as interpretative guidelines of other legal acts, or even customary law in
the long run. However, being such legal fact, capable of creating legal
effects, is according to d' Aspremont not sufficient to qualify it as a legal
act. The latter creates effects only at the explicit will of its authors,
hence the distinction to "hard law". 6
As for the negotium (the content) of a legal act, it can also be softer
or harder. Soft, non-normative content does not produce rules that
would commit the subjects. The negotium of a legal act can be softened
without invalidating it or transforming it to a legal fact. 87 The softness
of the negotium will not affect the status of the instrument as law. It
will, however, reduce law's ability to oblige the parties, reflecting on
the obligation and precision dimensions of Abbot et al.
83. Id. at 401. Their approach thus is wide as it relies on both rationalist and
constructivist theories to cover, respectively, the utilitarian political economy aspects and
the culturo-anthropological aspects of the issue. Effectiveness is for these authors
interdependent with legitimacy, and they both consist of numerous components.
Effectiveness can be understood as the degree to which the set policy objective is achieved
as a consequence of the measure. Note the difference between effectiveness and
compliance. K. Raustiala & D. Victor, Conclusions, in THE IMPLEMENTATION AND
EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COMMITMENTS: THEORY AND PRACTICE
659-708 (K. Raustiala, D. Victor & E. Skolnikoff eds., 1998). Note also the difference
between behavioural effectiveness and problem-solving effectiveness. Ariel Underdal, One
Question, Two Answers, in ENVIRONMENTAL REGIME EFFECTIVENESS 3-45, at 6-7(E. L.
Miles et al. eds., 2001).
84. d' Aspremont, supra note 63, at 1084.
85. Id. at 1084-85.
86. Id. at 1084-87.
87. Id. at 1084.
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Blutman takes a similar approach using the notions of legal
(formal) source and the substance of the norm. 88 He further notes that
current studies group "soft law" into three: (1) non-binding decisions of
international organisations (2) non-obligatory agreements of states and
(3) recommendations of non-state parties (NGOs). 89 In the first two
groups, the softness emanates from what d' Aspremont called the
negotium - the lack of obligation of the non-binding content of the
norm. In the third group, softness is caused by the instrumentum and
the legislating party. Blutman does not consider the authority of the
author, and indeed probably not the delegation or the instrumentum
either. Moreover, neither precision, effectiveness nor legitimacy, are
directly relevant in this type of categorization. The strength of
categorizations such as Blutman's, lies in their simplicity and ease of
application, as well as the direct link to existing types of instruments.
C. Making Use of the "Soft Law Theories"
It would seem that the above selection of approaches to "soft law"
have varying degrees of explanatory power. Many of them consist of
dimensions that from the perspective of softness constitute continuums
rather than either or type binary choices. A careful combination of the
dimensions, whether continuums or not, appears a useful way to better
conceptualize "soft law" and to understand specific cases of
instruments' softness in international governance.
It seems possible to combine the assessments of softness along
many such dimensions onto a single, summarizing scale. A summary
value of softness may be useful in providing an overview of the
characteristics of the instrument that one is dealing with. It might even
be possible to define a point, a dividing line between soft and hard,
similar to that which we recognize between law and "non-law". One
may wonder, however, to what extent such a point is actually relevant.
First of all, all instruments, be they soft or hard in the end, are in any
event analyzed along the same dimensions of softness, just as water
may be measured for its coldness/hotness. But like water, is there a
metaphysical "melting point" where the definition of an instrument
changes from hard to soft in a way that would represent a drastic change
in its qualities, like (solid, hard) ice changes into (liquid, soft) water?
Most of the instruments are likely to have some degree of
softness/hardness anyway; only at the extremes are instruments entirely
hard or soft.
88. Blutman, supra note 67, at 606.
89. Id. at 607-08.
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Second, it seems important to perceive that any such dichotomy
between soft and hard is indeed only a summary of many aspects. It
appears more relevant to understand what the constitutive dimensions of
each summary value of softness in a particular case may be, in
particular on those dimensions that are close to the extreme ends of the
scales. This is so especially as regards the "instrumentum". On the one
hand, there are legal instruments, which in the context of international
governance consist of the formal sources of international law;
conventions, customary law and binding decisions of international
organizations. On the other hand, there are non-legal instruments, which
are all the other international or transnational public or private
instruments that are not formal sources of international law. 90 A hard
instrumentum thus refers to formal "law", while a soft instrumentum
means that one is not dealing with law. This in turn implies that to
qualify as soft an instrument that in terms of its instrumentum
dimension is "hard (law)", it would need to rank quite low (soft) on
many if not all other dimensions. Conversely, to consider as hard91 a
non-legal (and thus prima facie soft) instrument, it would need to rank
high across many, if not all, dimensions beyond the instrumentum. A
precise obligation by an authoritative NGO with strong oversight on the
implementation could perhaps achieve such hardness in a soft
instrumentum.
Third, an understanding of softness as relative and measured
against the same criteria for all kinds of instruments, whether formal
law or something else, is important. As could be seen in the discussion
in Section 2 on the voids left by (international) "hard law" in governing
TNCs, various types of instruments may have important roles to play.
Perhaps an instrument is not just a second best solution in a particular
case - or for particular ends within that case - but indeed the best, or
even the only means of achieving a policy outcome? 92 The situation for
which the instrument is intended needs to be analyzed along the same
dimensions to know what type of an instrument is required.
Finally, there is still an important aspect from the viewpoint of the
instruments' functioning that could be called systemic coherence. It
relates closely to the above points noted by Shaffer and Pollack: all
legal and non-legal instruments, whether hard or soft, also affect one
90. According to Guzman a categorical difference between harder and softer types of
governance is created here. Guzman, supra note 54, at 580.
91. Blutman describes that it is a common misconception that non-binding "soft law"
would influence less the actions of a state than a binding norm. Blutman, supra note 67, at
612.
92. For further explanation look to the arguments made in Section 3.
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another. Indeed, as was described above, soft instruments are often
seen as an alternative or complement to international "hard law".
Treaties can generate secondary (delegated) rules that may be non-legal.
Treaties can harden existing non-legal instruments, and non-legal
instruments may not only be an alternative or complement to legal
instruments, but also soften them. Non-legal instruments may even
become antagonists that work directly against treaties, as Shaffer and
Pollack have pointed out. 93
The types of conceptualizations portrayed in this Section can be
useful when the hardness/softness of multiple instruments, both legal
and non-legal, is assessed comparatively against one another. As
Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and Vihma point out, 94 the development of a legal
or non-legal instrument, and subsequently its qualities as a "harder" or
"softer" instrument in global governance, is only one variable in the
evolution that determines the long-term policy outcome. Moreover, the
choice as explained often involves a highly complex set of interrelated,
time- and place-specific variables and impacts. This touches the very
core of modern politics that struggles to address the dynamics of
globalism.
D. Towards a More Accurate Conceptualization of Softness in
Instruments

Linguistic conventions such as "soft law" are difficult to fight
against. 95 Political scientists make the observation that "[a] few
international institutions and issue-areas approach the theoretical ideal
of hard legalization, but most international law is soft in distinct

93. Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 46, at 788-96. This would seem to imply that the
effectiveness of an instrument can even be negative from the perspective of the policy
objective: it decreases rather than increases the ability to reach the set policy goal. This is
an important aspect explaining the reasons behind the existence of a legal void in TNC
governance. As was explained earlier, the void on TNCs is in part created by their ability to
influence law-making at various levels of governance. An important way to do so is to
swap from the role of a subject of international norms to that of an author of international
(private) norms by creating alternative (non-legal) norms that are antagonistic to the
objectives of prevailing legal instruments, or to other public instruments such as decisions of
international organizations or joint declarations of states. In other words, if we were to
measure the effectiveness of antagonistic instruments, a scale would need to continue from
"weekly positive" and "none" onto a "negative," when the point of reference are the
prevailing policy objectives rather than the alternative or direct objective of the law or other
instrument in question. Because this paper focuses on ways to fill in the voids left by "hard
law", the antagonistic aspects of non-legal instruments are however, not discussed further.
Id.

94. Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen & Vihma, supra note 66, at 400, 401.
95. Blutman, supra note 67, at 605.
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ways. " 96 The proposal here is to take the above-noted dimensions of
softness, fine-tune them, and use them to describe the instruments more
accurately. The assumption is that such a systemization/categorization
may be helpful to the understanding of policy instruments,
distinguishing for example between their softness and effectiveness. 97
It is further proposed here that each of these dimensions of softness
of Abbott et al. (obligation, precision and delegation) be specified a step
further into a few more accurate, particularly significant subdimensions. The proposed sub-dimensions improve the tool, because
their values seem especially instructive for the processes being studied
in this paper: the behavior of TNCs. 98
The 'obligation' dimension is perhaps the most ambiguous. As
indicated above, it seems that Abbott et al. 99 equate 'obligation' with
'legal obligation'. Such a definition of obligation would, however, not
clearly distinguish the dimension from (i.e. would limit it to) the
concept of instrumentum. The hard v. soft instrumentum distinction in
this paper makes a difference between two types of public instruments:
those that are and those that are not (formal) law. Only formal sources
of law oblige in the hardest sense of legally binding the parties and
being capable of enforcement through judicial means. These qualities
could be qualified as sub-dimensions of obligation, but because of the
importance of the either-or type binary distinction between what is or is
not a legally binding formal source of law, it seems appropriate to tum
them into a dimension of their own. lnstrumentum must therefore be
lifted out of the obligation dimension.
The obligatory nature of the instrument however also appears to
depend on the authority of the 'author' of the instrument and on its
mandatory quality. These should be the focus of the obligation
dimension. First, the authority sub-dimension of obligation reflects the
authority of the author over the addressees of the instrument. Some
institutions that adopt instruments on TNC behavior have more
authority over TNC behavior than others. There are various factors on
which such authority may be based. Authority will depend upon
whether there has been some grant of authority from the addressees of
the instrument to the author. It also turns on the involvement of experts
during the drafting, the perceived quality of the instrument, and whether
96. Abbott et al., supra note 73, at 421.
97. Obviously, there is likely to be overlap between the dimensions. A similar
pragmatic approach is taken by Shaffer and Pollack. Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 46, at
714.
98. See Abbott et al., supra note 73, at 403.
99. Id. at 401.
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the process leading to the text has allowed for consultations with the
addressees. In other words, the relationship between the authors and the
constituency of the instrument matters. This also explains why a single
institution ("author") may have authority in one specific case, but less
so in another. A higher level of authority will make the instrument
more obliging, and hence harder, regardless of its public or private
character.
Instruments created by the addressees themselves are usually
referred to as self-regulation, distinguishing them from other private
rule making by third parties. It is difficult to generalize whether a rule
to which specific private parties (such as TNCs) have committed
themselves is more obligatory or less obligatory than that created by
some other private parties without the involvement and/or assent of the
former (i.e. TNCs). Some NGOs are more highly regarded by TNCs
than others in terms of their expertise or trustworthiness, whereas others
may be more feared because of their effective publicity campaigns. All
such factors influence whether TNCs regard instruments to be
authoritative. It would also seem important to extend the obligation
dimension to the negotium, the contents of the instrument. A legal
instrumentum can contain a negotium devoid of any obligatory
language, such as 'shall'. At the same time, a non-legal instrumentum
can contain a negotium that is worded in unmistakably mandatory
terms. 100 The provisions of both legal and non-legal instruments can
attempt to guide the behavior of their addressees "in a stronger or
weaker fashion." 101 The obligation dimension hence would seem to
consist of two sub-dimensions: authority and the mandatory nature of
the instrument.
Also the precision dimension would, at least with regard to the
particular subject-matter of TNCs, seem to be improved if divided into
two sub-dimensions. Abbott et al.' s concept of precision related to the
object of the rule ratione materiae: "that rules unambiriously define
the conduct they require, authorize, or proscribe." 10 This is the
accuracy of the instrument. But precision would also seem to include
the specificity of an instrument towards certain actors or issues. Softness
or hardness of an instrument in terms of a certain group of actors such
as TNCs, also depends on whether the rules specifically address that

100. See A. Aust, Alternatives to Treaty-Making: MOUs as Political Commitments, in
THE OXFORD GUIDE TO TREATIES 46-72 (D. B. Hollis ed., Oxford University Press 2012).
101. D. BODANSKY, THE ART AND CRAFT OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
103 (Harvard Univ. Press 2010).
102. Abbott et al., supra note 73, at 401.
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group. The softness in other words is influenced also by the scope of
the instrument ratione personae. A narrow, specific scope increases
hardness especially in the international context, where the absence of an
institutional framework moves the ex post interpretation and application
of general rules to the hands of the actors to be governed-the TNCs, in
this case, and also states within whose jurisdiction the TNCs act. 103 The
precision dimension therefore is enhanced by including the subdimension of "specificity" in addition to what could be redefined as its
"accuracy".
Delegation, 104 finally, concerns primarily the question of how
much authority to implement and enforce the instrument is delegated to
others, how much is retained by the author of the instrument, and how
much simply remains undetermined. Delegation to third parties
increases hardness, and is vital where precision in terms of specificity is
low. 105 Delegation of interpretive authority is a variety of delegation
that links back directly to accuracy, i.e. precision ratione materiae.
Furthermore, the softness of the delegation also appears to depend
on to whom exactly the authority is delegated, i.e. the authorship of the
delegated acts. Close ties, even a shared identity amongst those
authorized to implement the instrument and those addressed by it soften
the delegation dimension. Delegation is harder when an auditor or
NGOs enforce the instrument, than where the TNCs, as the subjects of
the instrument, enforce their own rules. It is also important to
distinguish between delegation in rule-making and dispute settlement
(i.e. judicial) functions. 106
To sum up, the tool proposed here incorporates the following
dimensions of softness:
•

the instrumentum (formal source of law v. other instruments);

•

obligation (authority and mandatory nature of the language);

•

precision (accuracy and specificity); and

•

delegation (extent and authority of delegation).

These softness-related dimensions measure only specific qualities
of the instrument. They may be combined and may interact with
numerous other qualities of the instruments, such as how quickly they

103.
104.
interpret,
at 401.
105.
106.

Id. at 414.
"Delegation means that third parties have been granted authority to implement,
and apply the rules; to resolve disputes; and (possibly) to make further rules." Id.
Id. at 451.
Id. at 408.
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can be enacted, how representative they are, etc. A discussion on the
qualities of the instrument itself also easily merges into a discussion on
the impacts that the instruments have. International lawyers and legal
scholars often concentrate on compliance, while political scientists
assess e.g. the effectiveness, dynamic and static efficiency, legitimacy
and administrative burden of the instrument, with a clear emphasis on
effectiveness. 107 Mitchell convincingly argues that compliance is only a
subset of effectiveness, and indeed from the perspective of this paper it
is the final policy outcome-a change in the environmental and human
rights behavior of TNCs-that is relevant. 108 As this paper specifically
addresses the question of the aptness of "soft law" instruments to
govern TNCs, the effectiveness of instruments thus is a relevant, yet
limited part of the analysis. It is worth repeating that softness and
effectiveness are separate but interrelated issues, and that only softnessrelated qualities are analyzed in this article; the other qualities of the
instruments are not assessed. 109
The following tool emerges:

107. R.B. MITCHELL, INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 146-80 (Sage
2010).
108. Id.; Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen & Vihma, supra note 66.
109. Qualities such as static and dynamic efficiency, and administrative burden, are
typically assessed.

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol41/iss2/3

34

Kalimo and Staal: "Softness" in International Instruments: The Case of Transnationa

2014]

"Softness" in International Instruments

291

The aspect of systemic coherence-the complementing, replacing,
precursory or antagonistic impacts that the instruments have against
each-seems worth bringing forth in some examples in view of the
earlier discussion. The coherence may be depicted as follows:

Figure 2. Systemic coherence of soft law instruments.

E. Applying the Tool on Public Legal Instruments, Public Nonlegal Instruments and Private Instruments
In order to structure the application of the tool to particular
environmental and human rights instruments in Section V, it is useful to
categorize the instruments in a preliminary fashion. First, as was
indicated in Section IV.A., it is possible to distinguish between the
formal sources of international law (legal instrumentum) and the nonlegal or "soft" instrumentum. It is not implied that non-legal instruments
cannot bind actors politically, nor that they cannot be successful in
addressing a policy problem. The distinction simply reflects that such
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instruments cannot legally bind states and can in most cases not be
enforced through judicial means. Therefore, there are some good
reasons why non-legal instruments cannot operate in the same way as
legal instruments.
Second, the broad non-legal category can be further sharpened 110 by
separating public instruments from private instruments. 111 Three broad
categories of instruments can thus be identified: 112
• Public Legal Instruments are the formal sources of
international law - i.e. the legal instrumentum within the
context of the international legal order - consist primarily of
conventions, customary law and binding decisions of
international organizations. These instruments are in the left
column of Table 1, while non-legal instruments form the
right column.
• Public Non-Legal Instruments include the output of
international organizations, two or more states collectively,
or even more loose gatherings of public officials (such as
collaborative networks), that are however not laid down as
formal international law. 113
'Public' thus denotes the
centrality of public actors: state representatives,
intergovernmental organizations, other public officials.
• Private Instruments 114 in contrast include the output of
private or primarily private transnational initiatives, such as
guidelines or standards. A few instruments, such as the UN
Global Compact and other public-private partnerships,
partly fit under either category, public or private. The
distinction public/private may be particularly relevant in the
area of TNCs, where the private authorship of an instrument
110. Cf. Id.
111. Compare the IN-LAW project which leaves private formal instruments outside of
its ambit.
JOOST PAUWELYN, RAMSES WESSEL & JAN WOUTERS (eds.), INFORMAL
INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING (Oxford University Press 2012).
112. These three groups are different from those distinguished by Blutman: the output
of international organizations; non-binding output of states directly other than what is part
of the formal sources of international law; and the output of civil society which is per
definition non-binding. Blutman, supra note 67, at 607.
113. Blutman distinguishes more categorically between state instruments and
instruments adopted by international organizations. However, because the adoption of
instruments within international organizations is heavily influenced by states a further
distinction would not seem useful or justifiable.
114. The type of private instruments that this article analyses are never legal
instruments, so that the addition 'non-legal' is superfluous. Private actors are of course
perfectly capable of adopting legal instruments in the form of private law contracts, but
those are outside the scope of this research.
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usually points to the involvement of either the regulated
TNCs themselves or their staunchest critics, NGOs. The
difference between the Public Non-Legal and Private (NonLegal) Instruments (as well as the overlap between them) is
highlighted with background shadings in the right-hand
column of Table 1 below.
The most noteworthy environmental and human rights instruments
can be grouped into these three categories of Public Legal Instruments,
Public Non-Legal Instruments and Private Instruments as shown in
Figure 3 below.

LEGAL
INSTRUMENTUM
(Formal Sources of
International Law)

PUBLIC
(States and IOs)

V .A. Public Legal
Instruments

•

ICCPR, ICESCR,
other human
rights treaties;

•

Multilateral
Environmental
AgreementsSecurity Council
Decisions

NON-LEGAL
INSTRUMENTUM
(Other than formal
sources of
international law)
V.B. Public NonLegal Instruments

•

UN Guiding
Principles on
Business and
Human Rights

•

OECD
Principles on
Multinational
Enterprises

•

UNEP
Guidelines 115

115. E.g., Charles Thomas, Tessa Tennant & Jon Rolls, The GHG Indicator: UNEP
Guidelines for Calculating Greenhouse Gas Emissions for Businesses and Non Commercial
Organizations
(2000),
available
at
http://www. unepfi .org/fileadmin/documents/ghg_indicator_2000 .pdf (last visited Mar. 25,
2014).
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PUBLICPRIVATE
(Mix of States/
IOs and TNCs/
NGOs)

-

PRIVATE
(TNCs)

-

PRIVATE
(NGOs)

-

• UN Global
Compact
• UN Business
Partnerships
• Equator
Principles
• Voluntary
Principles on
Security and
Human Rights
V.C. Private
Instruments
• Corporate
Codes of
Conduct
• Extractive
Industries
Transparency
Initiative
• Forest
Stewardship
Council's
Forest
Principles
• !SEAL
Alliance-labels
• Social
Accountability
International
Standards

Figure 3. Categories of environmental and human rights instruments.
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It seems that instruments belonging to different categories are
likely to denote certain recurring combinations of dimensions of
softness. These dimensions are marked in Figure 4 below, although
there may also of course be other soft characteristics as the analysis
further below will clearly show.
Public Non-legal
Instruments

PrivateNon-legal

Instruments

Figure 4. Hypothetical Illustration of the "softness" of instruments.

The possibility of such different dynamics of softness, as well as
different underlying explanations, justify a separate analysis of
instruments from each of the three categories. The categories of Public
Legal Instruments, Public Non-Legal Instruments and Private
Instruments thus constitute Sections V.A., V.B. and V.C. in the
discussion that follows below.

V. APPLYING THE CONCEPTUAL TOOL ON SOFTNESS TO

PRACTICAL CASES
In this Section, the conceptual tool created in the preceding
Section is applied to practical case examples on human rights and
environmental instruments that deal with TNCs. The approach has two
objectives. First, the tool's scores along the dimensions of softness
enable a sharper differentiation of the numerous instruments that apply
to TNCs. Second, the application of the tool will allow for observations
of potential connections between the instrument's softness (both along
individual dimensions and overall) and how it operates. Ultimately, this
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enables preliminary reflections on the relationship between (categories
of) instruments' softness and their effectiveness. It might even enable
the grouping of measures into some type of sub-categories on the basis
of their softness, as measured along the dimensions.
The instruments that are to be analyzed have been selected for
their central place in the legal system for this area (Human Rights
Covenants), for their high profile (UN Guiding Principles, OECD
Guidelines) or their visibility towards the public (UN Global Compact,
Forest Stewardship Council). In the TNC context, instruments often
combine human rights with environmental protection.
As may be recalled from the previous Section, the preliminary
application of the tool grouped instruments into three general
categories, that are each discussed in the Sections that follow: Public
Legal Instruments (Section A), Public Non-Legal Instruments (Section
B) and Private Instruments (Section C). 116 The instruments have been
chosen so as to provide case examples that are representative of each of
those categories. 117 The selected instruments for each category will be
scrutinized along the (sub )dimensions of softness of the conceptual
tool-obligation (authority and mandatory nature of the language);
precision (accuracy and specificity); and delegation (extent and
authority of delegation)-to add further nuance to the analysis.
A. Public Legal Instruments
1. Preliminary Observations
Instruments that are formal sources of international law-treaties
and binding decisions of international organizations-possess a legal
instrumentum, and have thereby specific characteristics compared to
non-legal instruments: only formal sources of law are capable of
creating obligations that are hard in the sense of being legally binding
and capable of enforcement through judicial means.
Most international law, aside from a few obligations under
customary law, is nonetheless not applicable to TN Cs directly 118 as was
explained in Section II. Treaties and binding decisions of international
organizations also usually do not specifically address TNC behavior.
116. A few of the examples amount to such an important participation of both private
and public actors that they may also be considered to constitute a separate public-private
category.
117. The first group, Public Legal Instruments, were already discussed in Section 2 to
establish the existence of a legal void. The observations in the following section on them
will therefore build upon the previous analysis in Section 2.
118. NOLLKAEMPER, supra note 22, at 58-59.
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The hardness of the instrumentum of Public Legal Instruments is
therefore in the particular context of international governance not
equaled in the negotium part when measured along the dimensions of
creating obligations on TNCs and being specific in doing so.
Authority as a sub-dimension of "obligation" emanates in this
category of instruments from public authors, states and, to a much lesser
extent, international organizations. However, a state as a public
authority is not always authoritative as a rule maker, when it adopts
instruments to address its own behavior, the obliging authority of the
instrument is at the state's own discretion, and thus lower than when it
is set by a binding Security Council Chapter VII resolution. States also
do not have much authority over activities that take place outside their
jurisdictions, which is very relevant in the context of TNCs. This type
of exception therefore limits public authorities' power in terms of the
obligatory nature of the enacted instrument.
On the other (sub-)dimensions in the tool, the softness of Public
Legal Instruments may in principle vary like it varies in all other types
of instruments. In the absence of direct obligations and likely poor
specificity, the tool places special emphasis on the delegation dimension
of international public law instruments. Are the implementing tasks
comprehensively delegated, and do the delegatee bodies possess the
necessary authority to oversee the process? It should be kept in mind
that because the states in any event need to act in-between the
international requirements and TNCs, there already are two steps in
applying international public law instruments.
The delegation
dimension of the tool shows how there is one further step to be taken
into account.
The state's implementing authority and responsibility to apply the
international provisions is often delegated to a public body such as a
ministry or agency. Although an actor other than the TNCs
themselves, the authority of the delegation is limited by the fact that it
was these very states that adopted the instruments in question, and they
are addressed to these very same states. The implementing and
interpretive authorities are in this sense not delegated to a truly
independent actor. The state's independent authority in the delegation
will depend on many factors, but there is often little in the instruments
to guarantee it, and much to restrain it. For example, the interests of the
state may be too close to that of the TNCs for it to exercise
'independent' delegated authority over the corporations. This holds true
for host states, as the Chevron case vividly illustrated, but also for home
states, which may be unwilling to constrain the operations of 'their'
corporations abroad.
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Another problem is that international jurisdictional laws limit the
authority that is legally delegated to the home state. Home state organs
enforcing or adjudicating on 'their' corporations may rightly fear that
such extensive exercises of jurisdiction are for the most part prohibited
by international law. The Shell Nigeria case showed that even where a
home state judge declares itself competent, it may only be able to apply
the law of the host state, which in that case was far below the standards
prescribed by the home state. 119 Third, a state may be unlikely to
proactively enforce the rules, and will often only intervene if the victims
or their representatives bring a case against the state authorities. Local
inhabitants or vigilant NGOs may be required to force the state to
assume its role as the delegatee. An example is again the Chevron case,
where only a decades-long effort by interest groups was able to move
the case forward.
Truly relevant delegation would mean third party oversight over
the states' performance of their delegated tasks with regard to TNCs.
The following sections will show that such oversight is nevertheless
often deficient on all levels: national, regional as well as international.
In conclusion, also the delegation sub-dimension seems therefore rather
soft for many Public Legal Instruments on TNCs.
A tentative picture can thus already be envisaged .before applying
the tool to provisions of particular Public Legal Instruments in areas of
human rights covenants and multilateral environmental agreements.
Public Legal Instruments are formally binding upon states that are
parties to them, but not upon TNCs nor do they generally contain
mandatory and precise requirements specifically about their behavior, or
delegation of oversight regarding state actions vis-a-vis TNCs. Public
Legal Instruments thus appear soft along all dimensions in their
application to TNCs. The conclusion seems almost counter-intuitive.
'Hard law' could leave a void in terms of TNCs because it is in fact not
hard at all.

2. The Human Rights Covenants
The human rights covenants ICCPR (International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights) and ICESCR (International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) illustrate the softness that may
plague Public Legal Instruments in the field of human rights. The
Covenants amount only to what Knox calls a due diligence obligation,

119. See supra Section 2.5.3; Milieudefensie v. Dutch Royal Shell (LJN: BU3535)
(2013).
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"an obligation of conduct and effort, not of result," 120 regarding human
rights violations between private actors such as TNCs and individual
citizens. It is sufficient for the state governments to satisfy their
obligations to just take "reasonable steps" in trying to prevent
violations. Individual states and national legal orders retain rather large
discretion to determine appropriate measures.
Admittedly, the Human Rights Committee has commented that
states must protect individuals "also against acts committed by private
persons or entities that would impair the enjoyment of Covenant rights
in so far as they are amenable to application between private parties or
entities.'' 121 But how exactly the rights apply to private actors, and
which actions are required of states in particular situations is left to the
states themselves to determine. Moreover, the General Comments of
the Covenant's bodies are not legally binding. Research conducted
under the UN Special Representative for business and human rights'
mandate shows that in practice, very few states actually have "special
policies, programs, or tools designed specifically to deal with corporate
human rights challenges." 122 The conclusion is that the "due diligence"
standard leads to a low level of obligation, and that the lack of accurate
guidance on which actions are a part of that due diligence standard
amounts to a low level of precision, both in terms of accuracy and
specificity.
As for the duties of home states to oversee that corporations based
within their jurisdiction respect human rights extra-territorially, the
Covenants are even more ambiguous: "The committees have not
expressly interpreted the treaties as requiring states to exercise
extraterritorial jurisdiction over abuses committed abroad by
corporations domiciled in their territory. Nor however, do they seem to
regard the treaties as prohibiting such action, and in some situations
they have encouraged it." For example, the Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights has suggested that state parties take steps to
"prevent their own citizens and companies" from violating rights in
other countries. 123 Thus, the dimensions of obligation and precision
appear to be for home states even softer than for host states.

120. Knox, supra note 21, at 22.
8, UN Doc.
121. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 31,
CCPR/21/Rev.l/Add.13 (May 26, 2004).
122. See Human Rights Council, Human Rights Policies and Management Practices:
Results from Questionnaire Surveys of Governments and the Fortune Global 500 Firms, UN
Doc. A/HRC/4/35/Add. 3 (Feb. 28, 2007).
123. Ruggie, supra note 9, at 830.
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Is the softness of such low levels of obligation and precision
mitigated through oversight by third parties, delegation? The Human
Rights Committee (HRC) and the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (the Human Rights Bodies) may be considered as a kind
of 'secondary' delegatee: they monitor whether the states complete their
delegated task of providing horizontal protection. Such interventions by
the Human Rights Bodies will not be able to strengthen the delegation
much in practice, however, as it is widely acknowledged that these UN
bodies have only very limited powers. The so-called 'views' the HRC
adopt in specific cases are non-binding as are the General Comments of
both committees.
Regional courts such as the European Court of Human Rights
have declared themselves incompetent to assert jurisdiction outside the
territory of the member states of the European Convention on Human
Rights, except where a member state exercises effective control, but this
is only possible in cases of either full occupation 124 or military action on
the ground. 125 In the developing regions, where the consequences of the
void are felt most, oversight mechanisms are much weaker. They are
practically absent in Asia, 126 while the African Court of Human and
Peoples' Rights is slowly starting to make use of its competences. 127
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights seems in this respect most
promising in the short term. However, the primary focus of all these
courts often is, or at least should be, in scrutinizing government's own
inappropriate conduct. Scrutiny of governmental oversight of corporate
conduct would seem a second-tier priority.
The Shell-Nigeria case implies that home state courts will at most
oversee that the state applies to national corporations the domestic law
of the host state, but not that it applies the ECHR or the ICCPR. The
OECD National Contact Points are a very modest attempt to oversee
human rights violations outside ECHR territory. The Contact Points fall
in this paper under the next category of Public Non-Legal Instruments.
124. Cyprus v. Turkey, A. 25781/94, 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. 731, 1 76, (2001); Loizidou v.
Turkey, App. 15318/89, 20 Eur. H.R. Rep. 99, 162, (1995).
125. See Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, A. 55721/07, 53 E.H.R.R. 18, (2011); Bankovic
& others v. Belgium, A. 52207/99, 12 December 2001, para. 82.
126. The ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) has as
of yet no real judicial powers. See James Munro, The Relationship Between the Origins and
Regime Design of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR),
15 lNT'L J. HUM. RTS., (2011).
127. A first decision was issued on 15 December 2009, in the matter of Michelot
Yogogombaye v. The Republic of Senegal. See Chacha Bhoke Murungu, Judgment in the
First Case Before the African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights: A Missed Opportunity
or a Mockery of International Law in Africa?, 3 J. AFRICAN & INT' LL. 187 (2010).
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These examples are well aligned with the conclusions of the UN
Special Rapporteur. States seem to escape effective oversight by other
delegated bodies, irrespective of the level of governance.
3. Environmental Agreements

The previous discussion on Public Legal Instruments in the field
of human rights indicated that these tools often lack in terms of their
obligation, precision and delegation.
International environmental
agreements may however be used to illustrate that such deficiencies are
not an unavoidable characteristic of Public Legal Instruments, but rather
a consequence of more or less deliberate choices in constructing the
instruments. In other words, hardness is possible to achieve, also in
international law. The International Convention on Civil Liability for
Oil Pollution Damage (the CLC Convention) 1992, 128 provides an
instructive example. The CLC Convention is an international maritime
treaty that was adopted to ensure that adequate compensation is
available for oil pollution damage caused by accidents of oil tankers. 129
Article IX of the Convention states that "[ eJach Contracting State shall
ensure that its Courts possess the necessary jurisdiction to entertain such
actions for compensation."
The convention is extremely precise and framed in mandatory
terms. It reads almost like an insurance contract. 130 Paradoxically, as the
128. International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (Civil
Liability Convention, (CLC)), International Maritime Organization (Nov. 29, 1969),
available
at
http://www. imo .org/About/Conventions/ListOft:onventions/Pages/InternationalConvention-on-Civi l-Liability-for-Oil-Po llution-Damage-( CLC).aspx (last visited Mar. 27,
2014).
129. See International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov.
29,
1969,
973
U.N.T.S.
14097,
available
at
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTSNolume%20973/volume-973-I-14097English.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
130. For example, paragraphs 1-3 of Article V state:
The owner of a ship shall be entitled to limit his liability under this Convention in
respect of any one incident to an aggregate amount calculated as follows:
4,510,000 units ofaccount for a ship not exceeding 5,000 units of tonnage;
for a ship with a tonnage in excess thereof, for each additional unit of tonnage, 631
units of account in addition to the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (a);
provided, however, that this aggregate amount shall not in any event exceed
89,770,000 units of account
The owner shall not be entitled to limit his liability under this Convention if it is
proved that the pollution damage resulted from his personal act or omission,
committed with the intent to cause such damage, or recklessly and with knowledge
that such damage would probably result.
For the purpose of availing himself of the benefit of limitation provided for in
paragraph 1 of this Article the owner shall constitute a fund for the total sum
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text of for example the Preamble and Articles III and V of the
Convention show, a central aim of the Convention is in fact to limit the
liability of the ship owners. A number of scholars indeed criticize the
way in which a regime, which was meant to establish a balance between
the needs of the victims of oil spills (compensation for the harm) and
the needs of the economic actors (continuation of activities), favors the
latter. 131 The victims of a recent oil spill, caused by the tanker Erika,
have for that reason sought to escape the limitations of the international
civil liability regime. They try to rely on the more protective provisions
of national criminal law or EU waste legislation, 132 instead. 133 All other
public law instruments such as the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("HR
Convention") also seem incapable of alleviating the victims' concerns.
The precision and delegation of the HR Convention is low and much
inferior to that of the CLC Convention.
The example demonstrates how a Public Legal Instrument can be
very hard in terms of its obligations, precision and delegation, and that
representing the limit of his liability with the Court or other competent authority of
any one of the Contracting States in which action is brought under Article IX or, if
no action is brought, with any Court or other competent authority in any one of the
Contracting States in which an action can be brought under Article IX. The fund can
be constituted either by depositing the sum or by producing a bank guarantee or
other guarantee, acceptable under the legislation of the Contracting State where the
fund is constituted, and considered to be adequate by the Court or other competent
authority. Id.
131. Cf A.E. Boyle, Globalising Environmental Liability: The Interplay of National
and International Law, 17 OXFORD J. ENV. L. 3 (2005); EDWARD H.P. BRANS, LIABILITY
FOR DAMAGES TO PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES: STANDING, DAMAGE, AND DAMAGE
ASSESSMENT (200 I); LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE TO THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT (Colin M. De la
Rue ed., 1993); Gotthard M. Gauci, Protection of the Marine Environment Through the
International Ship-Source Oil Pollution Compensation Regimes, 8 Rev. EUR. COMP. & INT'L
ENVT. L. 29 (1999); Magnus Goransson, Liability for Damage To The Marine Environment,
in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: PAST ACHIEVEMENTS AND
FUTURE CHALLENGES 345, 345-58 (Alan Boyle & David Freestone eds., 1999); David
Wilkinson, Moving The Boundaries of Compensable Environmental Damage Caused by
Marine Oil Spills: The Effect of two New International Protocols, 5 OXFORD J. ENVTL. L. 71
(1993). For more critical approaches, see Anne Daniel, Civil Liability Regimes as a
Complement to Multilateral Environmental Agreements: Sound International Policy or
False Comfort?, 12 Rev. EUR. COMP. & INT'L ENVT. L. 225 (2003); Michael Faure & Wang
Hui, The International Regimes for the Compensation of Oil-Pollution Damage: Are They
Effective?, 12 REV. EUR. COMP. & INT'L ENVT. L. 242 (2003); Armelle Gouritin, The
International Regime for the Compensation of Oil-Pollution Damage. A Good Candidate to
Have a Human Rights Approach?, 20 REV. EUR. COMP. & INT'L ENVT. L.194 (2011); and
Drame lbrahima, Recovering Damage to the Environment per se Following an Oil Spill:
The Shadows and Lights of the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions of 1992, 14 Rev. EUR.
COMP. & INT'L ENVT. L. 63 (2005).
132. See Case C-188/07, Commune de Mesquer v. Total Fr. SA, 2008 E.C.R. 1-4501.
133. See Gouritin, supra note 132, at 194-207.
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it may then tend to be working to shield rather than to govern the
specific powerful group of TNCs, in the quoted example the shipping
compames.

4. Concluding Perspectives on Public Legal Instruments
The application of the softness tool on Public Legal Instruments
reveals that they tend to score low on the mandatory language, precision
and specificity in terms of managing TNCs and other private actors.
The level of obligation for states in fulfilling their tasks as delegatees
also remains ambiguous. Especially the extra-territorial enforcement of
home state laws against national corporations is rare. In many respects,
the 'hard law' turns out not to be hard at all, even if there clearly is
potential for it be so.

Hard

Soft

Figure 5. Softness of TNC related Public Legal Instruments in human rights
and environmental protection.

B.

Public Non-Legal Instruments

1. Preliminary Observations
The second group, Public Non-Legal Instruments contains
agreements between state parties, state-centric institutions or even
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looser gatherings of public officials. The proliferation of international
organizations has increased the importance of public yet non-legal
instruments, 134 and this is also true for the governance of TNCs. Such
instruments are therefore not a new phenomenon in international
governance, and their longstanding role has been described by scholars
such as Schachter, Lipson and Aust. 135
The obvious observation on the softness of the entire category of
Public Non-Legal Instruments is what distinguishes them from formal
law: that governments and international organizations (I Os) have opted
for a non-legal instrumentum, that is not formal law. The non-legal
nature of the instrumentum is often reflected in the denominations of the
instruments, such as 'recommendations' or 'guidelines'. Sometimes a
closer analysis of the IO's constitutive instrument, or of the content of
the agreement, is necessary to establish that one is indeed dealing with a
non-legal instrumentum.
Many Public Non-Legal Instruments that relate to TNC behaviour
are adopted through, or by, IOs such as the Organization for Economic
Cooperation in Europe (OECD), the United Nations (UN) and the
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). Their authority
tends to vary on a case-by-case basis: the UN as an eminent
organization can assert great moral authority on state and TNC
activities, while the OECD is regarded highly by TNCs for its
competence and expertise on economic issues. The obligations created
by the authority of other IOs, for instance UNEP, towards TNCs are in
many cases softer. What is relatively new in Public Non-Legal
Instruments is that increasingly they contain a mixture of provisions that
are intended to directly cover the behaviour of non-state actors, even
though the non-state actors have no official part in the adoption of such
instruments. This increases the obligatory nature of the instruments
towards TNCs. On the other hand, the member states of international

134. JOSE E. Alvarez, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS (2005). See,
e.g.' CHRISTIAN BRUTSCH & DIRK LEHMKUHL, Complex Legalization and the Many Moves to
Law, in LAW AND LEGALIZATION IN TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS 9, 9-27 (Christian Brutsch
& Dirk Lehmkuhl eds., 2007) (discussing the increase in international law making and
legalization of transnational relations); Kai Raustiala, Institutional Proliferation and the
International Legal Order, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE ART 293, 293-316 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff &
Mark A. Pollack eds., 2012) (referring to institutional proliferation and the rise of
institutional density).
135. See Anthony Aust, The Theory and Practice of Informal International
Instruments, 35 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 787 (1986); Charles Lipson, Why are Some
International Agreements Informal?, 45 INT'L ORG. 495 (1991); Oscar Schachter, The
Twilight Existence of Nonbinding International Agreements, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 296 (1977).
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organizations voting in favor of such instruments tend to equate them
with political agreements. The language of the instruments is not
mandatory, and hence does not create obligations: not on the TNCs, the
states, nor on the IOs adopting them. The member states rather tend to
share the idea that the TNCs' behaviour needs to change in certain
ways, and wish to point each other's actions into that direction. The
instruments that are directly addressed to TNCs only encourage them to
act in a certain way.
The sub-dimensions of precision-the accuracy and specificity of
the instruments - appear to vary widely in Public Non-Legal
Instruments. Specificity perhaps tends to be the 'harder' sub-dimension
of the two, as the instruments occasionally address specific kinds of
businesses and specific types of TNC behavior, but are less often very
accurate about what exactly the states and TNCs are in practice
expected to do.
Finally, the delegation dimension tends to be low across Public
Non-Legal Instruments, as the implementation and interpretation of the
instruments is mostly left to the enacting states and IOs themselves.

2. The OECD Guidelines and National Contact Points
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) adopted the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises in
1976, and revised them in 2000 and 2011. The OECD Guidelines are
"recommendations addressed by governments to multinational
enterprises operating in or from" OECD Member States adhering to the
Guidelines. 136 They "provide non-binding principles and standards for
responsible business conduct in a global context," 137 thus apparently
aiming to fill the void left by the Human Rights Covenants with their
The Guidelines encourage
unclear stance on extra-territoriality.
companies to "[r]espect the internationally recognised human rights of
those affected by their activities," 138 "wherever they operate." 139
In terms of precision, the OECD Guidelines are thus specifically
addressed at multinational enterprises and are quite accurate as to what
is expected from them. For example, the Guidelines state that

136. Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev., OECD Guidelines on Multinational
Enterprises 3 (2011 ), available at http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/48004323 .pdf (last
visited Feb. 11, 2014) [hereinafter OECD Guidelines].
137. Id.
138. Id. at 19.
139. Id. at 17.
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[a] State's failure either to enforce relevant domestic laws, or to
implement international human rights obligations or the fact that it may
act contrary to such laws or international obligations does not diminish
the expectation that enterprises respect human rights. 140
However, much of the language is not phrased as obligations. In
most provisions, 'should', 'seek ways to' or 'does not diminish the
expectation' in the provisions just quoted above prevail over 'shall', 141
It remains unclear where in the Guidelines an obligation for the TN Cs 142
to actually act in accordance with them is really created. Perhaps it
flows from the 'procedural' obligations that are phrased in more
mandatory terms. 143 For instance, TNCs-if acting in accordance with
the Guidelines-must have an internal policy on human rights, carry out
human rights due diligence and "provide for or co-operate through
legitimate processes in the remediation of adverse human rights
impacts." 144 Yet the Guidelines do not mention any sanctions on
transnational corporations that do not carry out such tasks. It should be
recalled that for the TNCs, the Guidelines indeed only establish nonbinding principles. The ability of the procedural provisions of the
Guidelines to set obligations that amount to a high level of hardness in
the sense of the tool will hence depend on the authority of the
instrument, and the OECD more generally. As was noted above, the
corporate community would seem to regard the organization rather
highly. 145
A further dimension along which to measure the hardness of the
Guidelines is the delegation of their implementation and enforcement.
The Guidelines do set legally binding obligations on the OECD member
states in this respect. The states must, amongst other things, establish
"National Contact Points" ("NCPs") to assist companies and their
stakeholders in complying with the Guidelines. 146 This obligation finds
a legal backrest in Article 5(a) of the OECD Convention, which
specifically mandates state parties to follow the OECD Guidelines'
procedural and institutional rules regarding the setting up of NCPs and

140. Id. at 38.
141. See e.g., OECD Guidelines, supra note 137, art. IV.1-IV.3.
142. The OECD Guidelines uses the terminology "MNEs." Id.
143. Id. art. IV.4-IV.6.
144. Id.
145. For an example of a critical approach to the authority of the OECD Guidelines,
see Oldenziel & Wilde-Ramsing, OECD Guidelines lack teeth, influence, OECD WATCH
(Sept. 25 , 2009), available at http://oecdwatch.org/news-en/oecd-guidelines-lack-teethinfluence (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
146. OECD Guidelines, supra note 137, Part II.I.
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the proceedings that they are to follow. 147 However, 1t 1s doubtful
whether the NCPs may be considered independent from the executive
branch of the states that establish them. As noted, this triggers
problems on the role of the state as a delegatee. 148 This problem is
slightly less serious in OECD Guidelines than in many Public Legal
Instruments, because the state is implementing standards that apply
directly to the TNCs instead of relying on their indirect application
through the duty to protect. It has been argued that the NGOs also play
the role of a delegatee, next to the NCPs themselves, because the
procedure allows NGOs to bring cases to the attention of the NCPs. 149
In practice, this is the way in which a case usually reaches an NCP.
A more serious problem is the limited extent of delegation. The
ultimate power of the NCPs resides in their ability to make public
statements. While the power of negative publicity in inducing changes
in TNC behavior ( or at least in the image it wishes to promote) should
not be underestimated, it usually still falls short of the obligatory force
of for instance monetary fines or the judicial prosecution of individuals.
There are nevertheless good reasons to doubt the extent to which the
NCPs are, or can be expected to be, performing their tasks as effective
implementers and interpret of the Guidelines. In fact, there is no sign
that TNCs would actually have been publically reproached in more
cases than the odd one out. For example, in the eleven cases over a
period of ten years-a low figure in itself-on which the NCP of the
Netherlands so far has reached a Final Report, not once did it find a
reason to publicize the violations of substantive rights. 150 In but a few
cases did it find that transparency, communication and other such more
14 7. Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,
art.
5(a),
OECD
(Dec.
14,
1960),
available
at
http://www.oecd.org/general/conventionontheorganisation foreconomiccooperationanddevelopment.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2014) [hereinafter COECD].
148. The Netherlands tried to mitigate this problem by making its NCP a more
independent body, but the OECD Guidelines require at least some measure of government
involvement, so that independence could only partially be achieved. For instance, the
Minister of Foreign Affairs can still make a statement before a report is made public. See
Dutch National Contact Point: Aspirations and Expectations Met? Report of the NCP Peer
(2010),
available
at
Review
Team
http://www.oesorichtlijnen.nl/sites/www.oesorichtlijnen.nl/files/final_peer_ review_report_d
utch_ ncp_with_annexes_ 17_march_2010. pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
149. COECD, supra note 148, at 1774. According to Schuler, another possible role of
delegatee is reserved for the OECD Investment Committee, but its role is limited to posting
clarifications of a general nature and it cannot overrule statements by NCPs in specific
cases.
150. OECD Guidelines for Responsible Business Conduct, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, available at http://www.oecdguidelines.nl/ncp/closedcomplaints/ (last visited Mar.
25, 2014).
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secondary issues were below the OECD standard. 151 It urged the
companies in question to improve those particular points, or only
congratulated them for having already done so. In the remainder of the
cases, the NCP concluded that no 'investment context' or 'nexus'
existed, so that the situation fell outside the scope of the OECD
Guidelines, 152 or that bilateral talks between the NGO complainant and
the company had already brought the issue to a close. 153 The figures on
the Dutch NCP reflect those on other OECD member states. 154

Delega on
(Extent

author y)

"Softness
in average"

Soft

Hard

Figure 6. "Softness" of OECD Guidelines.
151. See e.g., Neth. Nat'l Contact Point, Final Statement of the Dutch NCP on the
"Complaint (May 15, 2006) on the Violations of Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation
(PSPC), Pursuant to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises" (July 14, 2009),
available at http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/43663730.pdf. (last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
152. See Neth. Nat'l Contact Point, Final Statement of the Dutch NCP on the Specific
Instance Raised by Shehri-CBE Concerning Makro-Habib Pakistan Limited, Raised on 9
October 2008 (Feb. 2010), available at: http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/46085466.pdf
(last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
153. See Neth. Nat'l Contact Point, Final Report of the National Contact Point for the
OECD Guidelines in the Netherlands on the Specific Instance Notified by CEDHA,
INCASUR Foundation, SOMO and Oxfam Novib Concerning Nidera Holding B.V. (Feb. 3
2012),
available
at:
http://www.oesorichtlijnen.nl/sites/www.oesorichtlijnen.nl/files/final_statement_nidera.pdf
(last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
154. See J. OLDENZIEL, J.WILDE-RAMSING AND P. FEENEY, OECD WATCH 10 YEARS
ON
ASSESSING THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTfNATIONAL
ENTERPRISES TO RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS CONDUCT 10-11 (OECD Pub. 2010).
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3. The United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights ("UN Guiding Principles")
The UN Guiding Principles are the result of a UN Human Rights
Council mandate to the Special Representative of the UN SecretaryGeneral, John Ruggie. On the basis of the mandate, Ruggie was to
develop such principles within the framework proposed in his Report to
"Protect, Respect and Remedy". 155 The Principles rest accordingly on
the Report's three pillars of protection, respect and remedy:
The first is the State duty to protect against human rights abuses by third
parties, including business enterprises, through appropriate policies,
regulation, and adjudication. The second is the corporate responsibility
to respect human rights, which means that business enterprises should
act with due diligence to avoid infringing on the rights of others and to
address adverse impacts with which they are involved. The third is the
need for greater access by victims to effective remedy, both judicial and
non-judicial. 156
The text of the UN Guiding Principles was consulted extensively
with a wide variety of relevant actors ranging from governments to
businesses and NGOs. 157 The substantive principles of the UN Guiding
Principles are quite similar to the OECD Guidelines, which in their
2011 version were aligned with the former. 158 Yet, the UN Guiding
Principles have a broader scope ratione personae, because they include
TNCs from all UN member states, rather than from the industrialized
OECD countries only. Ratione materiae, the UN Guiding principles are
not limited to investment settings, as are the OECD Guidelines. In
other words, the UN Principles apply to a larger number of states and
TN Cs, and to a wider array of situations.
The UN Guiding Principles were adopted by the geographically
representative UN Human Rights Council. The Principles' hardness
along the obligation dimension of the tool is likely to benefit from the
rather strong systemic coherence with the human rights Covenants. As
explained previously, systemic coherence denotes the influence that one
instrument may have on the performance of another along the
155. Ruggie, supra note 9.
156. UN Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, Guiding Principles on
6 A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011), available at
Business and Human Rights, Intro.,
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN. pdf (last
visited Mar. 30, 2014).
157. Id. 12.
158. This is understandable since the most recent version of the OECD Guidelines
(2011) explicitly states that they are in line with the UN Guiding Principles. OECD
Guidelines, supra note 137, at 3.
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dimensions of the tool. The interaction between a similarly aligned
Public Legal Instrument, such as a human rights Covenant, and a Public
Non-Legal Instrument, such as the UN Guiding Principles, could
mutually increase the hardness of both instruments. In this case both
instruments are even a part of the UN human rights system. The
Principles could lead judiciaries to interpret more specifically the
obligations of states as delegatees vis-a-vis TNC conduct under the
Covenants. 159 Since all parties to the human rights Covenants are also
parties to the UN, the UN Guiding Principles could be argued to
constitute a subsequent agreement or practice that contributes to the
interpretation of the pre-existing international human rights obligations
of states. 160 Alternatively, the UN Guiding Principles could be
considered a part of the opinio juris in the formation of new customary
rules. 161 Most relevant in this respect is that Part I of the UN Guiding
Principles deals with what the state "duty to protect" amounts to for
companies. The notion of systemic coherence thus provides insights in
how one instrument may have a high level of obligation but lack in
precision, while for another one the situation is the other way around.
Taken together, the instruments may alleviate each other's softness.
The obligations created by the UN Guiding Principles could therefore
be harder than the principled, non-legal nature of their form would lead
to assume, if they are 'hardened' by their close links to existing "hard
law" instruments. Conversely, the UN Guiding Principles could oblige
states, and consequently TNCs, by further 'hardening' the obligations
that the states have earlier agreed to as delegatees under human rights
Covenants.
This line of reasoning nevertheless holds in practice only where
the Public Non-Legal Instrument in question is actually hard
comprehensively, i.e. is also precise and uses mandatory language. It is
questionable whether this is the case for the UN Guiding Principles.
First, the duties of states in the Principles are not phrased in a
mandatory or particularly accurate fashion. The duty of the states
towards 'abuses by private actors' is in the Principles defined by using
wordings such as 'appropriate steps', 'discretion' and 'should
159. Arguably, there is no reason why this would not be true as well to some extent for
the OECD Guidelines, just as for all other Public Non-Legal Instruments, which may
influence the development of the law through interpretation or the development of
customary international law.
160. UN Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, supra note 157; see also
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31 (2)(b) ( 1969).
161. This is what happened to some of the principles established in the famous Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development (1992).
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consider'. 162 Compared with how state duties have developed in the
jurisprudence of the international human rights bodies, the UN Guiding
Principles may therefore be a step backwards in terms of accuracy. The
vagueness about what the duty to protect amounts to leaves the states a
wider margin of discretion on what is acceptable TNC behavior. 163 A
closer analysis of the Principles thus reveals evidence of systemic
incoherence, or antagonism, in contrast to what initially seemed like a
case of coherence.
Moreover, the express emphasis in the Principles that no
international obligations are set on the corporations directly, only on the
states, obviously dilutes the obligatory character of the Principles on
TNCs. In the period before the drafting of the Principles, the idea of
setting legal obligations for companies was still taken seriously. 164 The
'Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights' 165 were however
dismissed, after which the appointment of the Special Representative
followed. The part that directly applies to companies speaks only of
responsibilities to respect, but not of obligations in the same more
The concept of
explicit sense as the duties laid on states.
'responsibility' is not defined any further than that a certain standard of
conduct is "expected" of the businesses. 166 Moreover, the UN Guiding
Principles do not state on what basis this responsibility arises. Clearly,
it is not on the basis of a legal instrumentum. Since TNCs are not
legally bound by the Principles, the Principles represent to the TNCs, a
mere reiteration of pre-existing legal obligations, and a consensually
agreed moral obligation to reach beyond such legal obligations. The
hardness of such a moral obligation would depend on the authority of
the instrument. 167
162. UN Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, supra note 157,
Commentary on Foundational Principle 1, 3-4 (emphasis added).
163. Nicola Jagers, UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Making
Headway Towards Real Accountability?, 29 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 159, 161 (2011).
164. Id. at 160 ("From the very beginning professor Ruggie has steered determinedly
away from the concept of human rights obligations for corporations and instead placed
exclusive emphasis on the State as the sole duty-bearer."). See also De Feyter supra note
15, at 78.
165. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003).
166. U.N. Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, supra note 157,
Commentary to Principle 11.
167. Special Representative Ruggie notes quite positively the numerous consultations
he had with companies in establishing the Principles. See UN Guiding Principles,
Introduction, 7, 12. It is difficult to assess whether the consultations have truly supported
the authority of the Principles, or were merely something that TNCs participated in to
maintain a constructive image and to influence any obligations they could be subjected to.
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In terms of precision, the UN Guiding Principles represent the
high end in this paper's examples of instruments. They are slightly less
specific than the OECD Guidelines, because the drafters broadened
their scope of application to all businesses rather than to TNCs alone.
Also accuracy is reasonably high, with elaborate commentaries to each
of the 'Operational Principles' . The part that sets out the desired scope
and content of the companies' human rights due diligence processes
seems to some extent comparable to an environmental impact
assessment. 168 The focus of the Principles is on prevention, which the
TNCs have direct influence on, and which is often more effective than
remediation.
However, although precise, much is laid out in descriptive and
explanatory concepts that do not amount to new mandatory
requirements from the perspective of the dimension of obligation. So
while accurate, the Principles and their Commentaries at most reiterate
existing legal requirements. They, for example, note that in many
jurisdictions, complicity in committing a crime can lead to criminal
liability, even on TNCs, but they do not in any way expand the scope of
such liability. 169
Even precise obligations on companies need to be interpreted
when they are implemented into practice. The implementation is
optimally delegated to separate authorities. Yet on delegation, the UN
Guiding Principles are considerably softer than, for example, the OECD
An earlier version of the Principles envisaged an
Guidelines.
Ombudsperson, 170 but this role was apparently removed. The Principles
in the part on the state Duty to Protect probably confused rather than
clarified the role of states as delegatees in the implementation and
enforcement of international human rights law on TNCs. 171 The part on
Access to Remedy calls for various kinds of national and companybased non-judicial grievance mechanisms to complement the statebased judiciaries. In other words, the Principles neither strengthen the
role of home states nor do they create a centralized authority to
coordinate the implementation. They only advocate a very soft form of
delegation that excludes the power to take decisions. Moreover, such
mechanisms are only encouraged, rather than made mandatory. The
contrast to the National Contact Points (NCPs), mandated by the OECD
Guidelines, is clear.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id. at Principles 17-21.
Id. at Principle 17.
Ruggie, supra note 9, 103.
Jagers, supra note 164.
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Figure 7. Softness of UN Guiding Principles

4. Concluding Perspectives on Public Non-Legal Instruments
Public Non-Legal Instruments score around the average on several
dimensions of softness in the tool. While scoring rather high on the
dimension of precision, the Public Non-Legal Instruments in this paper
score low on the scale of delegation. They are low on the scale of
obligation as well, because the two sub-dimensions of obligationauthority and the mandatory nature of the language-give contradictory
results. The language used is often overtly non-mandatory, and this fact
cannot be fully compensated by the respectability of the IOs involved,
which is likely to reinforce the authority of the instruments. Public
Non-Legal Instruments, such as the OECD Guidelines and the UN
Guiding Principles, by definition lack the legally binding character of
their counterparts in formal treaties. Unless they are considered
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interpretive agreements, they cannot be invoked before a judge as
directly applicable to a dispute. Systemic coherence therefore could
influence the softness or hardness of a non-legal instrument. However,
unless that dynamic clearly increases the level of obligation and
delegation, the softness along these two dimensions only appears to
permit average levels of hardness in this category of instruments.

lnstrumentum
(formal source of IL or not)

Hard

Soft

Figure 8. Effects of systemic coherence - hardening Public Non-Legal
Instruments through hard law.

C. Private Instruments

1. Preliminary Observations

There are a great number of instruments that belong to the third
group: private instruments with direct relevance to TNC behavior.
Despite the variance among the instruments in this category, it is
possible to make some general assumptions on how they score on the
dimensions of the tool.
Private instruments, as explained above in Section IV, derive their
denomination from the fact that their dominant authors are neither states
nor state-centric international organizations.
These types of
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organizations do not have the capacity to adopt instruments that qualify
as formal sources of international law, i.e. as Public Legal Instruments.
None of these instruments in other words has a legal instrumentum. At
the same time, however, such authors do have the capacity to agree
among themselves on instruments that are of private kind.
Private instruments vary significantly by the (combinations of)
authors adopting them. These authors are principally businesses or their
associations, as well as national and international non-governmental
organizations (NGOs). In many fields TNCs and NGOs have even
entered into a veritable contest to set the applicable standards.
Sometimes a single instrument is ultimately agreed upon by TNCs and
NGOs together, such as the much discussed Forest Stewardship
Principles and Criteria. Some private instruments are adopted together
with or without the support of states or international organizations that
result in some cases in so-called public-private partnerships (PPPs). 172 It
is for that reason not always easy to distinguish between private and
public instruments, although in most cases either the public or the
private actors will be in a dominant role. The Voluntary Principles on
Security and Human Rights (VPSHR) and the Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative (EITI) are, respectively, examples of a venture
purely among TNCs and a venture between TNCs and a few states. In
some cases, such as the UN Global Compact, NGOs have heavily
criticized PPPs for being dominated from the outset by business
interests under the umbrella of what was formally a state or IO
initiative. 173
It is difficult to make generalizations along the tool's dimension
of authority with so many different author-addressee combinations.
Public authors are generally, but not always, more authoritative than
private parties, and the views on the authority of self-regulation vary
greatly. Low authority indicates low obligation, and hence softness.
Mandatory nature of the language differs widely as well: the Forest
Stewardship Council confronts a TNC with mandatory language, while
the UN Global Compact does not. It is voluntary to sign up for either
instrument.
Generally, the dimension of delegation is very soft across the
board, in particular where private instruments are a form of self172. Peter Utting & Ann Zammitt, United Nations-Business Partnerships: Good
Intentions and Contradictory Agendas, 90 J. Bus. ETHICS 39 (2009).
173. Payne, supra note 13, at 13-14. See also J. Martens, Precarious Partnerships: Six
problems of the Global Compact between Business and the UN, GLOBAL PoL'Y FORUM,
available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/225/32252.html (last
visited Mar. 20, 2014).
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regulation. The role of the state as delegatee is absent in the context of
private instruments. In the NGO-led schemes, there may be some
delegation to the NGOs, and the TNC schemes sometimes rely on
external firms that perform corporate social accountability audits. Yet
neither of them wields the investigative and prosecutorial power of the
state.
Specificity is often high, not only ratione personae, but also
ratione materiae, as companies are the only addressees. The used
language may range from the very accurate and mandatory expressions
of, technical standards to the very open and loosely formulated texts
that are predominant in the human rights and environmental context,
such as the Corporate Social Responsibility declarations of TNCs.
Finally, on precision there is again much variance. The NGO principles
usually score higher on this dimension than their TNC counterparts.

2. The United Nations Global Compact ("UN Global
Compact'' 174
The United Nations Global Compact is a cooperative initiative of
the UN and businesses, based on the multi-stakeholder ideology ofUNBusiness Partnerships that became prevalent in the UN in the 1990' s. 175
The Global Compact is based on the voluntary incorporation by TNCs
of a set of ten principles on human and labor rights, environmental
rights and fight against corruption into all their activities. The
companies also undertake to actively defend these values within their
'sphere of influence' .176 The Global Compact is completely voluntary,
both in regards to the initial registration as well as the subsequent
adherence to the rules. In earlier versions, the principles were quite
vague, but recently they refer to the UN Guiding Principles' chapter on
the responsibilities of businesses. The link subjects companies to the
more elaborate set of principles. They give more accurate, yet clearly
non-mandatory guidance about the steps that TNCs can take not to
violate existing legal rules. One may clearly notice the effects of
positive systemic coherence between the Compact and the Principles.
For example:
Principle 2: "Businesses should make sure they are not complicit in
human rights abuses," or
174. The content of this section is derived partly from Tim Staal, The Roles of Hard
Law and Soft Law in the Regulation of Global Business Conduct (2010) (unpublished
Master's Thesis, Vrije Universiteit Brussels).
175. Utting & Zammitt, supra note 173, at 39-40.
See
U.N
GLOBAL
COMPACT,
available
at
176.
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/index.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2014).
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Principle 9: "Businesses should encourage the development and
diffusion of environmentally friendly technologies."

The Global Compact awards companies who report their efforts
on a regular basis the right to sport the Global Compact Logo. A
sanction exists in the form of 'de-listing' a company that does not report
on its efforts over three consecutive one-year periods. 177 But in order to
remain listed, a company need not do anything substantive. This TNCfavorable overall set-up attests to the private sector dominance in the
Compact, and speaks for analyzing this public-private arrangement
under the category of Private Instruments.
The Global Compact is based on the idea of forming a
"community among the participants in which each individual actor
strives to appear as appropriate in relation to other members of the
network and to their stakeholders at large, a stance that should drive
them to act according to the articulated principles." 178 Thus, the success
of the Global Compact seems to depend on the plausibility of this
relation between (superficial) peer accountability, the attractiveness of
the Logo, and a TNC improved human rights and environmental record.
This outcome seems quite case specific: what for a diligent TNC with
high brand recognition and many aggressive competitors may create a
hard instrument, may for a low profile free rider appear completely soft.
The difficulty in even measuring such attributes against the tool
illustrates well in fact the uncertainties and vagueness inherent in this
type of an instrument.
In terms of softness, the drafters of the Compact seem to expect
that the lack of mandatory and precise wording, as well as the emphasis
on the Compact's voluntary nature, are compensated through the
hardness of other dimensions. The primary means here is the delegation
of the supervision over self-implementation to 'other members of the
network and to their stakeholders at large'. These groups include other
TNCs and NGOs. This has, however, arguably remained an empty
promise. First of all, a single group of actors, the TNCs themselves,
"appear[ s] as rule setters, rule enforcers, rule followers and rule
monitors." 179 This is at odds with the very idea of delegation. Second,
the delegation of authority to 'stakeholders at large' points to two
177.
Integrity
Measures,
U.N.
GLOBAL
COMPACT,
available
at
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/IntegrityMeasures/index.html (last visited
Feb. 18, 2014).
178. K. Sahlin-Andersson, Emergent Cross-sectional Soft Regulations: Dynamics at
play in the Global Compact Initiative, in SOFT LAW IN GOVERNANCE AND REGULATION: AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY ANALYSIS 140 (U. Morth ed., Edward Elgar Pub 2004).
179. Id. at 141.
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groups of actors: the general public and NGOs. The former may be
expected to react at press stories about serious violations, but will not
actively compare company behavior to the principles. So in that sense
the general public has a limited, if any task at all, in the governance of
the Global Compact. The most visible part of the public, NGOs, have
from the beginning played an ambivalent role in the Compact. NGOs
can be members, just like TNCs, and can therefore present a matter of
alleged 'egregious abuse' to the Global Compact Board. However, the
ultimate sanction is the 'de-listing' of the TNC. Such an outcome
seems superficial at best, and thus makes for a very unsatisfactory route
for NGOs. Compared to the OECD Guidelines' National Contact Points
or to the human rights treaty bodies, one may conclude that barely any
delegation of authority takes place under the Global Compact.

lnstrumentum
(formal source of IL or not)

"Softness
in average1'

Soft

Hard

Figure 9. "Softness" of the UN Global Compact, with the impact of systemic
coherence highlighted.

3. The Forest Principles of the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC)
Forestry is an area where nation states have consistently failed to
reach a global legally binding agreement. Negotiations on a global
forest convention were called off already at the Rio Earth Summit of
1992. 180 The International Tropical Timber Agreement (ITTA) is
180. B. Cashore et al., Can Non-state Governance
Ratchet Up
Global
Environmental Standards? Lessons from the Forest Sector, 16 RECIEL 158, 160 (2007).
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criticized for focusing on trade issues and leaving environmental
protection practically entirely at domestic discretion. What is left are a
number of initiatives that in the course of the 1990' s resulted in nonbinding instruments with weak substance. 181 Possibly for these very
reasons, forestry was one of the first fields where a new form of private
transnational regulation appeared: the NGO-based certification scheme
of the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) aims directly at changing the
behavior of large forestry companies, 182 often TNCs.
The FSC stands both for a governance scheme, the Forest
Stewardship Council, and for a set of principles on forestry. 183 These
"Forest Principles and Criteria" are further "elaborated through more
specific global standards, which are adapted to local conditions by
national or regional chapters." 184 FSC-certified forests must have a
continuously updated management plan, the implementation of which is
to be monitored and periodically verified by an accredited third-party
auditor. 185 Participating companies may actually be obliged to change
their policies, even in ways that are not necessarily cost-effective. 186
The Principles are specific in that they refer to one particular sector with
its own demands, and they are also quite accurate. There are detailed

All substantive provisions of the ITT A 2006, which entered into force 7 December 2011, are
indeed formulated as 'objectives' (Article 1), that are to be implemented through 'policy
work and projects' (Article 24) and funding (Article 21) and the conduct of 'studies (Article
See International Tropical Timber Agreement, Jan.27, 2006, U.N. Doc.
27).
TD/TIMBER.3.12 (Jan. 27, 2006).
181. Intergovernmental Panel on Forests; Intergovernmental Forum on Forests; United
Nations Forum on Forests, which produced the "Plan of Action" and the "Programme of
Work", contained in E/CN.18/2001/3/Rev.1, which Dimitrov describes as "masterpieces of
Machiavellian diplomacy". R.S. Dimitrov, Hostage to Norms?: States, Institutions and
Global Forest Politics, 5 GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 11 (2005).
182. The high intensity of research on the FSC shows that if any private regulatory
instrument is taken seriously and seen as a forerunner, it is the FSC. Interestingly, this
literature has also ventured into the complement-substitute-or-antagonist debate referred to
above. See E. Meidinger, The Administrative Law of Global Private-Public Regulation: the
Case of Forestry, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 75-76 (2006); Cashore et al., supra note 181; J. Zeitlin,
Pragmatic Transnationalism: Governance Across Borders in the Global Economy, 9 Soc10ECON. Rev 196-97(2010); T. Bartley, Transnational Private Regulation in Practice: The
Limits of Forest and Labor Standards Certification in Indonesia, 12 Bus. & POL. 7-8 (2010);
T. Bartley, Transnational Governance as the Layering of Rules: Intersections of Public and
Private Standards, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 517 (2011) [hereinafter Transnational
Governance].
183. Principles and Criteria for Forest Stewardship FSC-STD-01-001 (version 4-0),
FSC INTERNATIONAL (1996), available at http://ic.fsc.org/principles-and-criteria.34.htm (last
visited Feb. 10, 2014).
184. Zeitlin, supra note 183, at 196-97.
185. Id.
186. Cashore et al., supra note 181, at 161.
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provisions on tenure and use rights (Principle 2), indigenous peoples'
rights (Principle 3), community relations (Principles 4) and
environmental impacts (Principle 6). Moreover, all the mentioned
principles are phrased in clearly mandatory terms with every provision
using the verb "shall".
On the macro level, the hardness of the obligation will depend on
how many producers have been willing to join the scheme.
Participation is in principle voluntary, but the pressure to join is
nowadays rather high due to the strong developed country industry buyin and increasing consumer awareness. In 2012, it was estimated that
168.364 million hectares, 187 compared to over 4 billion hectares in total
forest coverage, 188 are FSC-certified. Overall, the high authority of the
scheme and its mandatory language render the scheme quite hard in
terms of the created obligation.
Delegation seems at first sight to be quite far reaching as well,
although ultimately it is the softest link in the FSC. The governance of
the FSC is in the hands of the tripartite Board of Directors, with
members representing Environmental, Social and Economic (i.e.
business) constituencies, and an equal participation from the global
North and South. 189 This multi-stakeholder set-up has arguably boosted
the authority of implementing the FSC. The interpretation of the Forest
Principles, discussed above, is in the hands of the FSC's organs, not in
that of the timber producing participants. The Board of Directors has
indeed from time-to-time issued interpretive decisions on TNC
activities. 190 Moreover, fulfillment by a timber producer of the FSC
Principles is validated by independent certification bodies, which have
in tum been accredited by the FSC. 191
However, there are at least two reasons why the FSC and the
certification bodies as delegatees do not reach a high level of
delegation. First, it is quite impossible for the certification bodies to
regularly check the companies' adherence with the principles. Its
executive capacities fall far short of those of public authorities, even in

187. Forest Stewardship Council, Facts & Figures, FSC INTERNATIONAL (2014),
available at https://ic.fsc.org/facts-figures.19 .htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2014).
188. Food and Agric. Org. of the U.N., State of the World's Forests 2012, 15, FAO
(2012), available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/016/i3010e/i3010e.pdf (last visited Feb. 10,
2014). In other words, about 4.2 % of total global forest coverage is certified by FSC.
189. Forest Stewardship Council, Governance, FSC INTERNATIONAL (2014), available
at http://ic.fsc.org/govemance.14.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2014).
190. See id.
191. Forest Stewardship Council, Accreditation, FSC INTERNATIONAL (2014),
available at http://ic.fsc.org/accreditation.28.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2014).
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developing countries. Its knowledge of 'local dynamics' is often
inadequate to really assess compliance with the FSC Principles'
criteria. 192 Second, and also connected to the lack of government
resources and the authority involved, the only sanction available is the
suspension of a forest's certification. As in most timber exporting
developing states, FSC certified forests still amount to only a fraction of
total production, this can hardly be called an effective sanction. To
summarize, a private, non-local authority without effective means of
enforcement makes for a 'softer' delegatee than a public, local
authority.
The weaknesses in delegation are further aggravated by the FSC' s
lack of legal instrumentum. FSC is a telling example of how the
softness of the dimensions of precision and obligation is quite limited,
yet the scheme still will have to yield in case of conflict with other,
formal rules such as domestic laws on forestry. As Bartley has
insightfully hypothesized and empirically researched with Indonesia as
case study, the design of private instruments such as the FSC and its
criteria disregard the domestic regulatory setting in which the rules are
expected to operate. For example, FSC Principle 2 requires that the
exploitation of certified local forests respects "the tenure and use rights
to the land and forest resources", and that such rights may only be given
up through the "free and informed consent" of the involved
However, in the large forestry industry country
communities.
Indonesia, the FSC requirements conflict with the domestic Forestry
Act. The Act has "affirmed state control over forest land", and although
the Forestry Act does protect local rights, "roughly ninety percent of the
twelve million hectares of state forest land in Indonesia has not been
properly defined". 193 The FSC certifications have added another layer
of rules, with requirements that are in part contradictory to domestic
laws. Yet in case of conflict, the local formal law obviously prevails, as
is even explicitly stated in FSC Principle 1.1. 194 This problem may lead
the FSC to "crumble under its own contradictions": a company must, to
192. Transnational Governance, supra note 183, at 533 (in the context of the
community land use rights demanded by Principle 2.2) ("One former auditor suggested that
assessment teams generally do not spend enough time on the ground to understand
community dynamics, explaining that you are 'lucky if there's an NGO there,' or it can be
difficult to learn the real situation.").
193. Id. at 532.
194. Revised FSC Principles and Criteria for Forest Stewardship FSC-STD-01-001
(V5-0), FSC INTERNATIONAL 12 (Rev. 2012), available at https://ic.fsc.org/principles-andcriteria.34.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2014) ("Principle 1: Compliance with Laws: The
Organization shall comply with all applicable laws, regulations and nationally-ratified
international treaties, conventions and agreements.").
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be in conformity with the Forest Principles, both act in accordance with
local law, as well as in contravention of it. 195 Had the FSC's Principles
been laid down by states in a formal source of international law, it
would have been much less clear that domestic forestry law would have
prevailed in case of a conflict. The example shows well how the
instrumentum dimension is fundamentally important.

lnstrumentum
(formal source of IL or not)

Hard

Soft
Figure 10. "Softness" of FSC.

4. Concluding Perspectives on Private Instruments
There are many labeling initiatives such as the FSC, 196 and many
voluntary standards with an approach similar to the UN Global
Compact. Some of them are even aimed at more specific sectors,
problems or groups of TNCs, such as the Voluntary Principles on
Security and Human Rights (VPSHR) and the Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative (EITI).
195. Transnational Governance, supra note 183, at 534. Compare the above stated
umbrella to Principle I with Principle 1.8: "The Organization shall demonstrate a long-term
commitment to adhere to the FSC Principles and Criteria in the Management Unit, and to
related FSC Policies and Standards. A statement of this commitment shall be contained in a
publicly available document made freely available." Id. at 13.
196. Many of these are assembled under the ISEAL alliance. See generally About Us,
ISEAL ALLIANCE, available at http://www.isealalliance.org/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2014).

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol41/iss2/3

66

Kalimo and Staal: "Softness" in International Instruments: The Case of Transnationa

2014]

"Softness" in International Instruments

323

Two main problems became apparent from the analysis of these
much-discussed private instruments. First, the great weakness in terms
of delegation is, in the words of Sahlin-Andersson, that "it is not so
clear who is governing whom." 197 Are NGOs governing TNCs? Or are
TNCs governing themselves-or even each other? What role remains
for governments? Second, it is unclear where obligation in these
instruments really comes from. They often refer to 'international
human rights standards', and stress that lower local standards, local
government abuses, or lack of government enforcement do not impede
what companies 'should' do. Yet it is not clear what exactly leads to
raise the requirements above the level of a mere moral obligation,
beyond a bare exclusion from a voluntary scheme. Is the marketplace
already sophisticated enough to create such an impact?
It was apparent that even an instrument that on the surface seems
to have a relatively high level of delegation, the FSC, in practice has
rather limited implementation resources. It moreover has to recede
where it conflicts with formal legal instruments that often maintain a
lower environmental or human rights standard.
Although the
implementing authority is clearly delegated, its reach remains limited.

VI.

CONCLUSIONS-THE MYRIAD EFFECTS OF
SOFTNESS

The tool developed in this paper has two aims. First, it aims to
contribute to the "soft law discourse" by promoting a move beyond the
inaccurate and overly generic term "soft law". 198 This term appears
problematic in the global governance of TNCs. It is proposed here, on
the one hand, because it is more accurate and useful in the legal and
political discourse to describe instruments on the basis of the three
general categories introduced in the previous Section: Public Legal
Instruments, Public Non-Legal Instruments and Private Instruments. 199
The categories build on the work of for example d' Aspremont 200and

197. Sahlin-Andersson, supra note 179, at 130.
198. See generally Abbott et al., supra note 73. With international law, they mean to
include explicitly formal sources of international law such as conventions/treaties. Id. at
402.
199. Compare these three groups with those distinguished by Blutman, who noted
output of international organizations; non-binding output of states directly other than what is
part of the formal sources of international law; and the output of civil society which is per
definition non-binding. Blutman, supra note 67, at 607.
200. d'Aspremont, supra note 63, at 1082-87.
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Blutman. 201
The basic distinction lies in the dimension of
instrumentum: the "container" of the instrument as opposed to its
negotium, the "contents."
On the other hand, it would add further, important nuance to the
understanding of the instruments to perceive them along four
dimensions of softness: the softness of the instrumentum, and of three
aspects of the negotium, namely obligation (authority and the
mandatory nature of the language); precision (accuracy and specificity);
and delegation (extent and authority of delegation). These dimensions
of softness, proposed originally by Abbott et al. 202 , and developed
further here, fine-tune the analysis by bringing forth key characteristics
of the instruments.
Second, through the tool the paper explores how such resystemization of instruments functions in the specific framework of the
TNCs, taking into account the challenge of finding solutions to the void
in their governance. The paper focuses in particular on how softness as
a characteristic manifests itself in different types of TNC related
instruments, and how this may link to the perceived void, and further to
the instruments' effectiveness. It may even be possible to contemplate
certain dimensions of softness, and combinations of thereof, that are
necessary in reaching effectiveness in different circumstances. Finally,
the utility and potential weaknesses of the conceptual tool itself may be
elaborated upon during its application to practical case examples on the
global governance of TNCs.

A. Effective Softness?
The application of the tool to various TNC related instruments,
including legal public instruments, illustrates well how an analysis of
softness is by no means limited to what is incorrectly called "soft law"
instruments. All kinds of hard and soft instruments can, and indeed
should, be scrutinized for their softness.
From the practical perspective of applying the instruments, the
essential question is whether, and to what extent, the observed softness
of an instrument correlates with its effectiveness. While the research in
this paper is not geared to answer this question with any definitiveness,
it is designed to prop exploratory insights onto what such a relationships
might be. The first observation along this trajectory is the usual claim
that "soft law" might be able to act as a supplement or a complement, or

201. Blutman, supra note 67, at 607.
202. Abbott et al., supra note 73, at 401.
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even an alternative, to "hard law. " 203 The claim assumes that somehow
an instrument that is soft along one or more of the depicted dimensions
can be effective in reaching a policy outcome. It can even potentially be
more effective in doing so than a "hard law" instrument would be.
The effectiveness in other words may link to softness-but how
exactly? At least two options appear to arise. In the first option, the
softness of one (or more) dimension( s) directly contributes to the fact
that the policy outcome is reached. This would reflect the scenario of
"soft law" acting as an alternative to "hard law": it is because of its
hardness along all the dimensions that a "hard law" instrument would
not able to reach the desired outcome. Softness would under this
assumption correlate positively with effectiveness.
The second option is that softness along one (or more) of the
dimension(s) is unavoidable for an instrument to be legally, politically,
technically, and/or in some other manner possible. Softness is the
critical prerequisite for a policy instrument to be created, yet it is the
other, hard dimension(s) of the instrument that in fact directly
determines the instrument's effectiveness. Soft instruments are in this
scenario a complement to "hard law". Softness as a characteristic only
has an indirect role. Without the subtlety the instrument would not
exist, and hence its qualities could not have an impact. The unique
quality of 'soft' instruments as complements is their achievability. 204
They are, as explained in Section III, a necessity if "hard law" options
are not at all, or not initially, available. But softness in itself will rather
work against, than for, the effectiveness of the instrument. Softness is
in these instruments just limited enough not to impede reaching the
policy objective in a sufficient manner. The perceptions on what is
considered sufficient may be quite subjective and, as the examples of
using soft instruments to govern TNCs implied, not always
representative of the reality.
The first option, i.e. the direct role and relevance of softness in an
instrument's performance, can be tested through a number of
propositions. The most different case approach would lead one to ask
whether there are instruments that are soft on all the dimensions, yet
still perform effectively. A positive answer would point towards
effective instruments that are already quite removed from classic
command-and-control law. Although the limited scope of the research
does not exclude the possibility, the TNC case studies conducted in this
203. "Soft law" may also be seen in some cases as an antagonist to "hard law", but
these questions are beyond the focus of this piece.
204. Abbott et al., supra note 73, at 401-03.
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paper did not offer support for this hypothesis. Rather, the observations
on the case studies seemed to point to the opposite direction: when
defined along the dimensions used in this paper, there seems to be a
negative correlation between softness and effectiveness. A negative
correlation would hence perceive soft instruments in a paradoxical way:
one should seek for the vital aspects of hardness in defining effective
soft instruments. If the hypothesis on a positive correlation held, the
ensuing question would then be whether an instrument's effectiveness
could be associated with a particular aspect of softness.

B. Effective Hardness?
Indeed, looking back at the three categories of instruments and the
empirical examples within them, the observations would appear to point
into the opposite direction: some measure of hardness may be required
on at least one, if not most, of the dimensions also for instruments to be
effective. Turning this around, even the absence of hardness on one or
two dimensions beyond the instrumentum-for instance lack of
precision and specificity in the human rights treaties, or the incomplete
delegation in the case of the FSC-may be fatal for its effectiveness.
The conclusion of the case studies was that none of the instruments in
any of the categories of Public Legal Instruments, Public Non-Legal
Instruments and Private Instruments seemed to satisfactorily achieve the
set human rights and environmental governance objectives regarding
TNCs. The disappointing observation could hence have an explanation:
each one of the TNC related instruments-even the "hard law"
instruments-lacked one or more crucial hard dimensions that would
have allowed them to be effective in that particular instance.

1. Over-Reaching
One may wonder, however, if the need to consider hard
dimensions in soft instruments is already a sign of "over-reaching":
have the soft instruments been set to achieve objectives that only
instruments that are hard on all dimensions can achieve? Are they
surpassing the limits of what soft instruments in directly filling a policy
void can reach, even theoretically? In cases of over-reaching, soft
instruments cannot act as complements nor as alternatives to "hard
law"--except perhaps in some narrow respects.
As may be remembered from the development of the tool, the
instrumentum is a core dimension of classic "hard law" instruments.
Soft instruments lack this key characteristic; only in the first group,
which consists of the formal sources of international law, are the
instruments formally speaking law. Private instruments as defined in
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol41/iss2/3
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this paper are adopted by private actors, either amongst themselves or in
collaboration with public authorities. Because private actors completely
lack the capacity to legislate, they cannot create formal instruments of
international law. The instrumentum is not legal. A logical reaction
would be to seek to increase hardness on the other dimensions of
obligation, precision and delegation-potentially even all of them. The
OECD Guidelines from the group of Public Non-Legal Instruments and
Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) from the group of Private
Instruments served as examples. As noted above, while perhaps
practically possible, such across-the-board hardness would mean that
the instrument measures hard in average, so much so as start to
conceptually changing its nature from soft to hard, and even from nonlaw to law, if hardened along the instrumentum to a legislative act. In
other words, the soft instrument has been "over-reaching", if the aim
had been in policy objectives that can in fact only be reached with
formal legal instruments that are hard on all accounts. It does not seem
justified, or even possible, to contemplate Public Non-Legal
Instruments or Private Instruments as effective alternatives or
complements to "hard law" in these types of situations. Their role
would remain partial, at best.
2.

Under-Reaching

The fact that an instrument's effectiveness is tied to more
hardness on a particular dimension does not have to imply that all
effective instruments be considered "hard law". In practice, the
relevance of such labels of hardness or softness is linked to the ability of
the tool to help in creating the impetus to amend (i.e. to harden) an
existing instrument in a tailored and adequate manner so as to reach the
set objective. The situation may be different to the above examples of
over-reaching. In cases of "under-reaching", the soft instrument is not
fulfilling its complete promise, which would still be within the
boundaries of what under the three categories and the four dimensions
still constitute soft instruments. Hardening a particular aspect of an
under-reaching instrument not would not always require pushing it
beyond the boundaries of what conceptually are soft instruments.
Understanding that the level of obligation and precision in the OECD
Guidelines is sufficient, but that it is mainly the delegation aspect of the
instrument that is lacking, could lead to amend the instrument in the
correct fashion. This would point towards amending the practice of
NCPs to become considerably more aggressive in publically
reproaching the companies for their violations of human rights law.
Published by SURFACE, 2014
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Figure 11. Instrument's achieved v. potential hardness in cases of underreaching and over-reaching instruments.

Indeed, delegation appears to be a dimension on which practically
all of the TNC-instruments that were used as case examples measured
on the soft end of the scale. This implies an almost structural deficiency
in delegating the implementation of the instruments. The observation
finds clear parallels in the discourse on the deficiencies of "hard law":
poor implementation and enforcement is also often cited as the weak
point of hard international environmental and human rights law. In this
important respect "soft law" therefore appears to offer very limited
remedies. To state this differently: non-legal instruments could most
fundamentally remedy the deficiencies of "hard law" if their unique
characteristics could innovatively improve enforcement. To reiterate
the above example: the impact of negative media coverage on TNCs
image can be drastic, and hence prompt sweeping changes in company
behavior. For example, heavy media attention led the company
Chiquita (formerly United Fruit) to completely overhaul in the early
1990s its dreadful corporate social responsibility policies on exotic fruit
business. Chiquita outsourced for example the corporate environmental
and social audits to an external NGO, the Rainforest Alliance. 205 Yet to
actually create such an impact, the application of this instrument needs
to be delegated to a party that is prepared and equipped to publicize it
205. DANIEL ESTY & ANDREW WINSTON, FROM GREEN TO Gow. How SMART
COMPANIES USE ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGY TO INNOVATE, CREATE VALUE AND BUILD
COMPETITIVE Aov ANT AGE 88, 183 (Yale University Press 2006).
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without hesitation and delay -not just in theory, but in practice. This is
a far cry from the current state of affairs, should the application of the
media provisions of the OECD Guidelines offer a representative
example in this respect.
It appears possible to give examples of under-reaching "soft law"
also in terms of all other dimensions of softness. The UN Guiding
Principles were an example of an instrument where the wording on what
is really expected is both ambiguous and drafted in non-mandatory
terms. More precise use of words that are clearly obligating would
harden this instrument in a way that would appear to be vital for
increasing its effectiveness in filling the policy void. Precision is a
dimension on which the non-legal instruments may score quite well,
because the tools can contain quite accurate provisions specifically
targeted at TNCs. It is in fact the legal instruments that may be underreaching on this aspect. The systemic coherence between soft and hard
instruments could in a useful way combine the precision of the soft
instruments with e.g. the hard instrumentum of for instance the Human
Rights treaties.
C. Softness - A Combination of Multiple Dimensions
It seems possible with the help of the developed conceptual tool to
synthesize the findings regarding the over-reaching and under-reaching
soft instruments a few steps further, still. The values of all the
dimensions of an instrument may be combined into a single value of
"average softness," as was explained in Section IV.D. above. The
softness/hardness of an instrument is only a single variable amongst
many other time- and space-specific, inter-related variables that affect
the overall policy outcomes in a globalized environment. 206 Yet a
summary value may be useful in having an overview on the
characteristics of the instrument that one is dealing with, even if the line
between soft and hard is a subjective continuum, not a "metaphysical
border" where the overall characteristics of an instrument would
suddenly drastically change like the qualities of water change in the
melting and boiling points. This may be exactly the point of using the
model proposed here: the fact that any instrument consists of four
dimensions with their "sub-dimensions" should quickly lead to a
realization that the denomination of an instrument as "hard law" or "soft
law" actually reveals very little of its characteristics. It is the
constitutive dimensions of the instrument that matter. Instrumentum is

206. Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen & Vihma, supra note 66.
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central, and admittedly the distinction of the formal sources of
international law implies a binary dimension.
But its binary nature and importance are tempered by the other,
continuum-type dimensions. They too can be crucial, depending on
such factors as the instrument's objectives and addressees. The case
studies on Public Legal Instruments showed how "hard law" may be
quite soft. Case studies across the groups of instruments seemed to
suggest that weak delegation of implementing tasks in some cases
'softens' the instrument more than a low measure of precision or
obligation. The continuums are therefore useful; they make an analysis
of the instruments more flexible and accurate, and facilitate detailed
comparisons between them. As Abbot et al. noted207 while developing
these three dimensions, they can also serve to trace an instrument's
evolution over time. The dimensions were used here as a means to
understand, explain and to propose nuanced improvements to various
kinds of TNC related instruments.
One might also speculate whether there are specific combinations
of these dimensions of softness that are particularly well or poorly
adapted for certain kinds of policy objectives and/or circumstances.
Such "pairing" could support the policy making process. The case
studies gave anecdotal evidence of such interconnections. For example,
in the case of FSC, the hardness of the instrument along the dimensions
of precision and delegation considerably alleviated the need to have
fully hard obligations. Market pressures on TNCs also contributed to a
lesser emphasis on delegation in this particular example.
States and IOs often seem to enforce international law upon TNCs
in a rather lenient fashion: the delegation dimension was soft on
virtually all the analysed instruments. Only very limited delegation to
more independent, international bodies seems likely in the near future as
well.
Hardness along the other dimensions may alleviate that
shortcoming only in some cases, such as the example of FSCs above.
More precise and specific provisions will make it harder for states to
argue that they are not under an obligation to act in a given situation.

D. Systemic coherence
Many authors have highlighted the importance of the systemic
coherence between different instruments.
Soft instruments may,
according to these views, act either as complements, alternatives or
antagonists to "hard law". This paper does not have as its objective to

207. Abbott, et al., supra note 73, at 405.
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delve into the systemic coherence of instruments. It does shed some
light on some of the interrelationships that were noticeable between the
UN Global Compact, UN Guiding Principles, the OECD Guidelines, the
Forest Stewardship Council, the human rights Covenants and domestic
law. In particular, the systemic inconsistencies and antagonistic
relations deserve further research particularly in order to better
understand the prospects of governing TNCs. The discussion merges
here with themes such as the fragmentation and integration of
international law208 and the management of institutional complexity in
global governance. 209

E. Prospects of Governing TNCs with "Soft Law"
1.

"Soft Law" as a Misnomer - But Softness as an Asset

The analysis above has elaborated on whether "soft law" may help
in filling the policy void left by "hard law" in governing transnational
corporations in the areas of environmental protection and human rights.
Softness may indeed be a quality that explains the characteristics of
policy instruments in a manner that is useful. However, this benefit has
often gone undetected or has
been overshadowed by
misunderstandings. 210 The softness of an instrument tends to correlate
negatively with its effectiveness-if any straightforward relationship
between the two is even verifiable. Softness as an overarching
conceptual construct might end up not only correlating with
ineffectiveness, but being defined by it. The notion of soft instruments,
let alone "soft law", as an optimal gap filler for legal voids appears in
this sense fundamentally flawed. Soft instruments may remedy policy
problems, but in most cases exactly despite of their softness.
Gearing the policy strategy towards "soft law" without properly
defining it could hence essentially threaten to misguide the entire effort.
Perhaps the clearest example is the UN Global Compact, which relies

208. See Koskenniemi & Leino, supra note 59, at 553; see also Study Group of the
International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising
from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682
(Apr. 13, 2006) (finalized by Martti Koskenniemi).
209. For institutional interaction, see generally Thomas Gehring & Sebastian
Oberthur, The Causal Mechanisms of Interaction between International Institutions, 15
EUR. J. INT'L REL. 125 (2009).
210. See d' Aspremont, supra note 63, at 1083; See also d' Aspremont' s recent
introduction in the Leiden Journal of International Law where he apologizes for devoting a
whole issue of the journal to such an oft-debated theme. Jean d' Aspremont & Tanja
Aalberts, Which Future for the Scholarly Concept of Soft International Law? Editors'
Introductory Remarks, 25 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 309 (2012).
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on softness quite explicitly. 211 "Soft law" is therefore not only a vague
and overly generic concept-it may be a precarious misnomer. The
case studies on the governance of TNCs gave insights into how "soft
law" approaches may create false assumptions, and might lead to
skewed policy pathways and meager outcomes. 212
The
conceptualisation of the instruments and of the issue at stake, as well as
the definition of the desired policy objectives, need to take place in
much more accurate and authentic terms.
2. Soft Instruments as Complements and Alternatives to "Hard
Law"

While "soft law" may be a misnomer, softness as a characteristic
that is first properly defined may prove to be quite useful. It helps in
explaining the characteristics of individual instruments. The notion of
softness may also be useful in more correctly understanding the general
characteristics that are commonly associated with soft instruments as we
noted them in Section III: their necessity, uniqueness and
unavoidability; 213 and their role as complements or alternatives 214 to
"hard law". The uniqueness of soft instruments can mean a number of
things. It can refer either to the instrument as a whole or to some of its
particular characteristics. This observation prompts us to rethink the
categories of Shaffer and Pollack, soft instruments as complements or
alternatives to "hard law". A unique instrument would seem to mean
that it combines softness and hardness in a different way along the
dimensions of obligation, precision and delegation. Unique soft
instruments are soft enough to be achievable-unlike a fully hard and
legal instrument-yet hard enough to be effective. Thus, they are able
to complement "hard law" in the narrow sense of addressing policy
questions that "hard law" simply could not address at this moment. This
is different from the occasional misconception that soft instruments are
unique and effective for their softness only. The notion of a soft
211. "The initiative seeks to combine the best properties of the UN, such as moral
authority and convening power, with the private sector's solution-finding strengths and the
expertise and capacities of a range of key stakeholders. The Global Compact is global and
local; private and public; voluntary yet accountable." Overview of the UN Global Compact,
UNITED
NATIONS
GLOBAL
COMPACT
(Apr.
22,
2013),
available
at
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/index.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2014).
212. See Utting & Zammitt, supra note 173, at 44, 47 (showing the wide belief within
the UN in the late l 990's that soft approaches are preferable, because of lack of UN
implementation powers).
213. See Section 3, supra.
214. The role of soft instruments as antagonists to hard law were excluded from the
scope of this paper.
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instrument constituting in these cases an "alternative"215 also seems
misleading: it hints at the existence of a choice-yet if the soft
instrument is unique in this narrow sense, there is none.
If the uniqueness of the entire instrument refers to its
distinctiveness from a "hard law" instrument, yet does not entail the
filling of policy gaps beyond what "hard law" can do, it seems to offer
an alternative to reaching a policy objective. Because certain softness on
some dimensions is "permissible" in terms of reaching adequate
effectiveness, a soft instrument can be the preferred alternative for other
reasons, such as for being less costly to negotiate, lighter to administer
or quicker to adapt to the evolving circumstances.
The uniqueness of certain (combinations of) characteristics,
instead of the entire soft instrument, leads to a different kind of
complementarity-the type Shaffer and Pollack described. 216 The
differences in the softness of a soft and a hard instrument lead them to
interact in a way that, together, creates a complementary result. The
complementary characteristics may make up for certain soft dimensions
in legal instruments-on which the complementing instrument is in fact
harder-and result in even harder combinations. Some non-legal
instrument may in this way prove harder on important dimensions than
many existing legal instruments, particularly on precision, even though
they are soft on others.
As for the unavoidability of soft instruments as a consequence of
globalization, the nuance that can be identified in the softness of
instruments calls for a similarly delicate attention in managing such
instruments. To the extent that globalization implies the predominance
of instruments without a hard instrumentum, it may imply doubtful
effectiveness. Yet this is not at all self-evident, and can only be
determined on a context-specific instrument-by-instrument analysis.
The complication would offer one explanation to why it is so difficult to
create clear-cut theories and approaches about the global governance of
TNCs, or governance through regime complexes more generally
speaking.
F. Epilogue: Revisiting the Chevron Case

While the Chevron case dragged on in the Ecuadorian judiciary
and now continues in the arbitration bodies, Chevron has aligned itself
with the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (VPSHR)
and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). Will these
215. Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 46, at 717-21.
216. Id. at 721-22.
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soft instruments offer a remedy to address the considerable
environmental degradation? Could they prevent similar cases from
taking place in the future? The EITI aims at transparent financial flows
between the extractive industry and their host governments. VPSHR
aims to prevent human rights abuses that would be a consequence of
companies' private security operations. Already in terms of the subject
matter, these instruments do not present comprehensive solutions to
address issues of environmental protection or human rights protection.
Regrettably, when assessed through the tool developed in this paper,
they appear moreover to be of the softest type. Both are predominantly
private, non-legal instruments, with some involvement of governments
in the VPSHR. The rather vague and non-mandatory principles are
quite soft in terms of precision and obligation, and auditing as the only
measure of delegation leaves this dimension soft as well. In fact, the
principal aim of both instruments may rather be to shield companies
from further liability rather than addressing fundamental aspects of
human rights or environmental protection related conduct. In other
words, a closer analysis of softness reveals there to be little hope for
these particular soft instruments preventing, let alone remedying, the
situation in cases such as Chevron.
More promising, at least for future cases, could be the National
Contact Points under the revised 2000 OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises. Especially insofar as the damage can be
qualified as (environmental) human rights or labor rights violations, a
'specific procedure' can be commenced before the United States
NCP. 217 As was discussed above in section V.C., such procedures may
lead to public statements by the NCP, or to a settlement of the dispute
between the parties. However, due to the very limited delegation
dimension, an NCP cannot order damages; it can primarily be useful in
ceasing the TNC conduct.

217. See US. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises,
U.S.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE,
available
at
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/oecd/usncp/index.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2014).
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